In the spring of 2014, we surrendered Crimea without a single shot. Of course, we had almost no loyal troops, the police switched sides to the enemy, the intelligence services stabbed us in the back, the local “elite” sold out completely, and the Kyiv government was shocked, weak, and confused, like a young girl before her wedding.
Could we have not given up Crimea? Of course, we could have. After all, we later managed to hold onto Odesa and Kharkiv. We needed to act quickly and decisively, mobilizing all the healthy forces of society and relying on international law. Most importantly, we needed to give the security forces a clear, categorical order – to shoot!
In 2014, Russia in Crimea was not as strong, the Kremlin was merely testing our resolve. If they had faced resistance, Putin might have called off the operation and returned to the status quo.
However, appetite grows with eating. After the annexation of Crimea, they turned their attention to the east and southeast of Ukraine. And again, there was no clear order given – to shoot! Hesitant security forces switched sides to the enemy, local “elites” eagerly sold out, and gangs seized weapon depots and military equipment.
The sluggish anti-terrorist operation was ineffective because it lacked broad public support. A widespread mobilization was not announced, and there was fear of distributing weapons to patriots. Volunteer battalions were neither banned nor officially permitted.
Populism was rampant. Poroshenko promised to end the war in three days, and upon coming to power, he first prohibited shooting. Later, shooting was permitted, but only gradually. The initiative was lost. A crazy, pompous parade was held in Kyiv on the bones of the Ilovaisk volunteers.
The first “Minsk” agreement was signed to stop the shooting, to prevent people from dying, to achieve peace. Because “I am a president of peace, not war.” Could we have won back then? Yes, if we had mobilized and given the order to shoot! At that time, Russia was weak in Donbas, with only a few battalions, and the local separatists were disorganized, poorly armed gangs.
There is an opinion (pure propaganda from the former regime) that “Minsk” allowed us to build an army that supposedly didn’t exist before. Firstly, the army did exist—who else was fighting then? Secondly, it wasn’t only us building an army. In the few months between the first and second “Minsk” agreements, two occupation army corps were created in the seized territories. Russia began forming new brigades, divisions, and armies in the regions bordering Ukraine.
Then the catastrophe of Debaltseve happened. Could we have won that battle? Definitely, yes. The enemy was straining all their forces, and we could have advanced in other areas of the occupied territory and cleared it of separatists, as demonstrated by “Azov” near Mariupol.
But again, mobilization was not announced, war was not declared, and there was fear of distributing weapons to patriots and giving a clear order – to shoot! We gave Russia time and opportunity to prepare for a major war. We were building an army, and they were building an army. We created a new brigade – they created a division. We repaired 50 tanks a year, they produced 50 new tanks a month. We were like a tortoise trying to catch a horse.
We decided that the most important thing was to stop shooting, to look putin in the eyes, and to undertake the “great construction” so that enemy tanks could reach Kyiv faster.
We refused to believe the obvious facts, denied the preparations for invasion, called Western leaders liars, did not conduct evacuations, did not announce mobilization, and did not give a clear command – to shoot!
And for two years now, we (they) have been trying to live as before, stealing as before, working haphazardly, avoiding responsibility, hoping for the West, and not announcing wide-scale military-economic mobilization, not putting the country on a war footing, not manufacturing weapons, catching poor people with military enlistment offices, and thinking that maybe it will blow over.
It won’t. If the aggressor is not stopped, he will never stop himself. It’s impossible to negotiate with an enemy who has tasted blood.
Decisive action is needed. A clear command – to shoot! All forces must be subordinated to this command.
What is needed is a total war that can only be carried out by an efficient state apparatus. But our system is not only ineffective, it is nonviable. It is like a dead body connected to a life support system, feeding on the healthy forces of society. The system consumes resources, lives off them, and does almost nothing to win the war, because it relies on the hope of making a deal.
P.S. War kills, but “peace” with russia kills much more.
Tags: crimea debaltseve Ilovaisk Minsk agreements peace plan russia ukraine war
