Do you know what electronic warfare (EW) and GPS spoofing are?
No, you don’t know what they are. I thought I knew too… But in Romania and Germany, there are people who understand and use them. This is no longer just simple concentric lines. Here, signals from several stations in the occupied territories of Crimea and Kherson region are involved.
Why? — To hide the direct route of the tanker ALTAI (Crude Oil Tanker) IMO: 9446427, owned by a company from GERMANY, from the port of Novorossiysk, Sheskharis terminal, to the anchorage of the Romanian port MIDIA — UN/LOCODE: RO MID (the red dashed line shows the actual track).
These naive owners think that when they sometimes go to Romania from the KTK berth (Caspian oil, not sanctioned), and sometimes directly from the Sheskharis terminal (“Transneft”, Russian oil), as they do now, they are hiding…
Friends, if anyone wants to help and has a direct connection with the German embassy or Ministry of Foreign Affairs — inform them about these schemers. At the same time, let them figure out why a German tanker has such a “Siberian” name.
This concerns the following voyage:
Tanker — ALTAI (Crude Oil Tanker) IMO: 9446427, Flag (Marshall Islands), Call Sign V7XL4, MMSI 538004508, DWT 115,952, Year of build 2011
Port of departure: RU NVS, date 2025-06-05 07:16 (UTC+3)
Port of destination: RO MID ANCH, date 2025-06-07 08:35 (UTC+3) (this is the waters of this port in the territorial sea of Romania).
For those who traditionally doubt in the Ukrainian manner, I am providing screenshots of the tracking map at large scale over Novorossiysk (map 2) and over Midia (map 3).
How naive these owners are:
Ship manager/Commercial manager COLUMBIA SHIPMANAGEMENT-GEU Grosse Elbstrasse 275, 22767, Hamburg, Germany
Registered owner ALTAI SHIPPING LTD C/O: Columbia Shipmanagement (Deutschland) GmbH Grosse Elbstrasse 275, 22767, Hamburg, Germany.
