During the massive overnight attack on Ukraine on July 12, Russian occupation forces (ROF) used Shahed-136 drones equipped with SIM cards.
Of course, some may recall the story from December 2023, when a Shahed-136 was found to contain a SIM card, clearly obtained from the temporarily occupied territories and using Ukrainian networks for more stable operation. Back then, even the most zealous members of our society criticized Ukrainian mobile operators, asking what was going on and who would be held accountable.
Frankly, the baseless harassment of telecom providers—which incidentally gave some individuals their moment in the media spotlight—seemed to be behind us. But while some barked and then fell silent, the problem did not go away; it only got worse.
The point is, the SIM cards found in the latest Shahed-136 drones are not stolen Ukrainian ones—they are Russian. And strangely, the usual “activists” who previously attacked national companies are now saying little about what should be done. Apparently, it’s not interesting, not profitable, or they simply don’t know. After all, it’s one thing to rant about “Kyivstar,” and quite another to propose a concrete solution—such as restricting rogue numbers that suddenly appear in Ukrainian networks during mass drone attacks. But doing that would require taking the issue up with the Ministry of Defense.
It’s worth noting separately that communication via SIM cards remains stable at altitudes of up to 1,000 meters—which are altitudes where drones are more likely to be shot down. It’s likely that ROF are experimenting with signal boosters, as the modem with a SIM card is often connected via a coaxial cable leading somewhere. Such cables are commonly connected to signal amplifiers, which in turn are connected to special antennas.
If a sufficiently powerful amplifier is used, stable communication can be maintained at altitudes of up to 2 kilometers. That would make the drone far less vulnerable to mobile fire teams.
I believe this issue, which has been steadily developing since December 2023, must be addressed here and now. Disrupting stable communication for Shahed-136 drones is just as important a countermeasure as all other tools in our defense arsenal.
