Is the Victory Plan a deception?

Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of President Zelensky’s “Victory Plan” is absolutely pointless—much like searching for the philosopher’s stone or inventing a perpetual motion machine.

This is because the “Plan” was clearly not created for implementation. This is why it deliberately includes points that cannot be realized in the next 10-15 years.

Take, for example, the overused point about the immediate admission of Ukraine to NATO. Even housewives know that NATO’s charter does not allow the admission of countries where military actions are taking place. In other words, the charter needs to be changed, and such changes would immediately be blocked by Hungary.

It seems more likely that NATO would declare war on the neo-empire than admit Ukraine under current circumstances.

So why the world tour presenting the “Plan” with a grand finale in Parliament? Logic suggests that the only practical goal of this loud process is for the president to be able to address Ukrainians again within six months. He would declare that they developed a great “Plan,” full of tasks and obligations for our partners (not for ourselves), and they failed to fulfill them. They just don’t want to make things dry and comfortable for us at their expense…

And thus, Ukraine is forced to move from the “Victory Plan” to the “Peace Plan,” whether anyone likes it or not. In other words, it’s not our government that failed the mobilization, weapons production, or the fight against corruption; it’s the inept partners who didn’t do what we instructed them from the Parliament’s podium…

Unlike the “Victory Plan,” the “Peace Plan” will be quite real, as it would involve finding a compromise with Russia under the supervision of the U.S. and China. Of course, this will come at the expense of territorial and political concessions, with Ukraine making noticeably more of them.

As far as I know, not direct negotiations, but certain consultations and exchanges of opinions through international mediators are already underway. And so far, the potential zone of compromise looks like a mix of the “Istanbul agreements” and “Minsk 2,” since Russia is ready to leave Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, retaining Crimea and Donbas—not legally, but de facto. But only on the condition that Ukraine does not join NATO and there are no NATO bases on our territory. As for the return of Donbas, Russia is potentially willing to discuss it if Ukraine transitions to a federal system and recognizes Russian as an official language. The first step of “goodwill” would be the lifting of sanctions on Russia’s banking sector and high-tech industries.

There are also points regarding troop disengagement and control of this disengagement, but those details don’t matter now. No final decisions have been made, and none can be made at this point. The more or less real outlines of the “Peace Plan” will only become clear after the U.S. presidential election.

Oleksandr Kochetkov