Serhii Kryvonos commented live on NV Radio about the recent reshuffles in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The Commander of the Ground Forces, Mykhailo Drapatyi, is now the Commander of the Joint Forces. Colonel Oleg Apostol of the 95th Air Assault Brigade has become the Commander of the Air Assault Forces. Former Air Assault Forces Commander Ihor Skibiuk has been appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff, while Robert Brovdi, famously known as “Madyar,” is the newly appointed Commander of the Drone Forces. His predecessor, Vadym Sukharevskyi, nicknamed “Borsuk,” has been reassigned as Deputy Commander of the Operational Command “East.”
“From my point of view, some military personnel were, to put it mildly, surprised and stunned by these appointments. And when people who have demonstrated themselves well at the tactical level are placed in positions that require operational and strategic-level knowledge, experience, and skills—knowledge and skills they clearly do not possess—this is truly a setback for the Armed Forces,” said Serhii Kryvonos.
1. Madyar is not ready to lead the Drone Forces. He still needs to learn more. Right now, he lacks sufficient experience and knowledge.
“He performed quite well at the brigade level,” says Serhii Kryvonos. Therefore, it would be appropriate for Robert Brovdi to remain at the tactical level for now. Leading the Drone Forces requires a much deeper set of skills and involves operational and strategic work.
A brief background: before the full-scale invasion, “Madyar” was a businessman. The Granum Group of Companies, co-founded by Robert Brovdi, was among the top five grain exporters from Ukraine to over 20 countries worldwide.
2. “Madyar” is a hyped-up legend. His popularity mainly comes from skillful self-promotion in the media space.
The general spoke with many military personnel who were unimpressed by the president’s decision to appoint “Madyar” as Commander of the Drone Forces. “There are people who worked with him or were alongside him in Bakhmut, and they have many questions about his work,” says Serhii Kryvonos. These military personnel can compare “Borsuk” and “Madyar” because they know both personally.
“In favor of the previous commander, they have far stronger arguments, which they shared with me,” the general said.
3. There is an opinion that Vadym Sukharevskyi had conflicts with Oleksandr Syrskyi. Serhii Kryvonos is aware of their disagreements but cannot disclose the reasons on air.
Moreover, creating a new branch of the armed forces is a rather difficult task, especially during wartime. Serhii Kryvonos knows what he’s talking about, having helped establish the Air Assault Forces in peacetime and the Special Operations Forces during the war.
“Therefore, I understand what Sukharevskyi faced. He had, let’s say, a behind-the-scenes struggle with certain representatives of the government at various levels. And comparing Sukharevskyi with ‘Madyar’—that’s just impossible. They are completely different levels, different experience, and different understanding,” explains the general.
Vadym Sukharevskyi is an Officer and a Man with a capital letter.
“People like him and Drapatyi could have been the foundation for the future of our Armed Forces. But unfortunately, the bureaucratic system won again, defeating those who wanted to change it,” said Serhii Kryvonos.
4. About the duties of the Commander of the Ground Forces.
During the war, there are three main tasks:
1️⃣ Conducting mobilization in close cooperation with local authorities, heads of institutions, and enterprises.
2️⃣ Defending Kyiv.
3️⃣ Preparing reserves.
This is exactly what the Commander of the Ground Forces should focus on, rather than rushing to put out “fires” on the front lines caused by someone’s negligence — which is where General Drapatyi was sent at one time. Previously, Syrskyi handled such issues when he led the Ground Forces.
As a result, “The issue of developing a reliable system of combat training and conducting combat drills at the scale of military units was neglected because there was no leader in charge of this process,” explains Kryvonos.
Why is it not effective for one person to both command the Ground Forces and extinguish “fires” on the front? Too many tasks. This person will be expected to succeed everywhere: both in quality mobilization and victories on the front line. But sitting on two chairs at once is impossible. You can fall. Even if the Commander of the Ground Forces doesn’t sleep at night, he still won’t be able to handle all the tasks. He simply won’t have enough time or strength.
5. About General Syrskyi’s micromanagement.
Here is a quote from General Kryvonos:
“The working style of General Syrskyi has always been like this. I worked with him at different times, in different positions, and I can say this: he hasn’t changed at all. He tries to get involved in every detail. On one hand, that’s very good, but on the other hand, it makes certain commanders dependent when it comes to making timely decisions.”
6. How will the recent reshuffles affect the situation on the battlefield?
According to Serhii Kryvonos, probably not at all.
“Three or four people cannot change the situation on the front for the better, but they can make it worse,” he said. Because it’s not just about personalities.
Even the most professional and honorable commander in the world will struggle to complete combat tasks if they don’t receive artillery shells, mines, food, ammunition, and materials to build fortifications on time.
Success in war depends about 40–45% on the military themselves, but 60–65% on how well the state supplies them.
For example, in the fourth year of the full-scale war, the country still hasn’t developed a mobilization plan.
“Let’s remember that mobilization is not just about people. Mobilization means transitioning Ukraine’s economy to operate under martial law or a special period, as well as adapting central executive authorities, local governments, enterprise leaders, institutions, and military units to wartime staffing levels. You see, the military aspect accounts for only about 15–20% of the overall mobilization challenges. We are looking at mobilization as just one-fifth of the functionality we need to implement. We want the military to create a fairy tale for us, but there won’t be any fairy tale because nothing else is working,” said the general.
8. On the Russian summer-autumn campaign.
On their Telegram channels and in pro-Russian media, the orcs are shouting that they have already won.
“For them, this summer is their last hope. They understand that for now they still have an advantage in numbers of people, equipment, and firepower, first and foremost. But they also realize that next year will likely bring significantly bigger problems. Because war isn’t about the personal bravery of millions of people. War is about the ability of a country’s economy to meet the needs of its armed forces,” emphasized Serhii Kryvonos.
But right now, the orc-economy is struggling. The general says that since the beginning of 2025, the Evil Empire’s budget revenue has dropped by 25%. That’s because the SBU, the Main Intelligence Directorate, and our military have done a great job dismantling the Russian rear supply enterprises. Now the orcs are freaking out and pushing forward desperately, because their economy will face even bigger problems ahead.
“So they’ll take off their last pants, their last shirt, sell it, or drink it away just to try to crush us. We can clearly see that we have a huge capacity to stop the enemy and win this war. But not only through personal bravery in combat along the front line, but through systematically striking the Russian rear. The number one task is to powerfully destroy the Russian rear while simultaneously strengthening our own. And this is the foundation of our success,” says Serhii Kryvonos.
That’s all from me.
Link to the broadcast
