Ukraine lost Vuhledar

1. The significance of Vuhledar. The defense of Vuhledar was a true feat by Ukrainian soldiers, who for two and a half years inflicted losses on the Russians near Vuhledar that were many times greater than ours and repelled two major offensives in 2022 and 2023. The city held a key position for controlling the southern flank of Ukraine’s defense forces in the Donbas. It was an extremely advantageous position, with a commanding height and dense urban development, providing better radio horizons for drones and firing positions for all types of weapons.

2. Consequences. Holding Vuhledar was highly beneficial. Its loss is a defeat that will have severe strategic consequences. An important fortified area has been lost, with numerous well-equipped positions and minefields. After this, the enemy will “roll up” the front and advance toward Velyka Novosilka from the east and Kurakhove from the south, where there are no longer such convenient defensive lines. Essentially, a new defensive line must be created immediately to cover the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions from the east.

3. When it was necessary to withdraw from Vuhledar, was the order timely and what losses did our soldiers suffer? 

The only route into the city, Vuhledar-Bohoyavlenka, came under enemy fire control on September 24, with the occupiers advancing to within 1,400 meters of the road. At that moment, the command of the Donetsk Operational and Tactical Group (Colonel Lutsenko) should have issued an order for a planned and organized withdrawal of troops from the city, as there were no forces available to deblockade the city. On September 26, drone strikes by the enemy completely cut off access to the city. Despite this, the command of the Operational and Tactical Group did not issue a timely order for withdrawal but continued to demand that the troops “hold their ground.” During the night of September 30 to October 1, the command of the 72nd Brigade, on its own responsibility, carried out the withdrawal of the last covering units due to the impossibility of continuing the defense. This withdrawal was executed under heavy enemy fire, resulting in losses.

In the last four days of the defense of Vuhledar, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade lost about 30 soldiers listed as missing in the city and on the retreat route. At one position, five soldiers were captured by the Russians, their identities not yet established, and they were executed on the spot, as confirmed by our drone footage.

4. The reasons for the loss of Vuhledar are as follows:

a) Lack of combat-ready reserves and reinforcements to replenish the losses of our troops and strengthen the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, which directly defended the city. This is the responsibility of the Armed Forces command.

b) The enemy’s numerical superiority by at least five times. Against the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, the Russians, according to the official report from the Russian Ministry of Defense on the capture of the city, concentrated the 36th, 37th Motorized Rifle Brigades, the 5th Tank Brigade, the 40th Marine Brigade, and the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reinforced by units from the 14th Special Forces Brigade. Additionally, to the north of the 72nd, they were attacked by the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 139th Assault Battalion. Thus, six enemy formations, reinforced by special forces and assault units and continuously receiving reinforcements for the offensive, were advancing against one of our formations, supported by several understrength and poorly armed Territorial Defense Battalions from the 125th and 123rd Territorial Defense Brigades and the combat-ready 1st Assault Battalion “Da Vinci,” which also did not receive reinforcements to cover their losses.

c) Weak organization and coordination in defense, task setting without considering real capabilities and without assessing the actual combat readiness of the troops. The leadership of the OTU and OSUV did not pay attention to organizing the mass use of drones, EW, RER, and covering troops from enemy drones in combination with fire means. The tactical position of Vuhledar and the open spaces around it allowed for the destruction of the advancing enemy groups with drones in coordination with other means, maximizing the preservation of infantry lives, but the military command did not concentrate drone units that could provide density and massiveness of strikes, which did not allow for compensating the enemy’s significant advantage in infantry.

d) The lack of well-organized counterattacks. For a long time, infantry units with low numbers and weak armament from the TRO were sent to the breakthrough direction, which could not restore the situation but only heroically halted the enemy’s advance for a short time. The line battalions of the 72nd did not receive either time for combat readiness restoration or prepared reinforcements. The only assault unit that the Armed Forces command transferred in the last four months to strengthen the 72nd Brigade was the 1st Assault Battalion “Da Vinci,” which was used due to a lack of reserves to defend north of Vuhledar and got involved in battles with units of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 139th Assault Battalion of the occupiers.

e) Lack of a well-organized second line of defense that would have allowed stopping the enemy in the area of the mines north of Vuhledar at pre-prepared positions covered by minefields.

5. Regarding the circumstances of the death of the commander of the 186th Battalion of the 123rd Territorial Defense Brigade, Ihor Hryb.

I am gathering information and talking to the soldiers of the 123rd Territorial Defense Brigade. Soon, I will write about the circumstances of Hryb’s death as I know them, the actions of the 123rd Territorial Defense Brigade in the Vuhledar area, the appropriateness of decisions regarding its deployment, the command and organization of the brigade, and the consequences for the defense of the city.

Yuriy Butusov

Ukraine Front Lines