Categories: ANALYTICS

Intense battle in Kursk region: Russians use gas pipeline for attack

The situation in the sanitary zone of Kursk region continues to escalate, requiring immediate decisions from the command.

The enemy is carrying out massive attacks along the entire front of the Kursk sanitary zone. Russian and North Korean forces have a significant numerical advantage and are assaulting relentlessly. Our troops are well-supplied with ammunition and demonstrating extraordinary heroism and resilience, yet the enemy advances without regard for losses. The sanitary zone’s front is narrow, and the enemy has taken our supply routes under heavy fire from the flanks, making it the most difficult sector to hold.

Today, enemy infantry was detected infiltrating near the city of Sudzha — Russian forces used a gas pipeline to covertly deploy an assault company, evading drone surveillance and breaking into our defensive lines. The pipeline is now under increased surveillance, the enemy’s staging area has been identified, and efforts are underway to eliminate the infiltrators.

From a tactical and operational standpoint, holding the sanitary zone in Kursk region is no longer justified. The political motives are clear to everyone, but military logic must also prevail. I consider the Kursk operation successful only because, in its early phase, we inflicted disproportionately higher losses on the enemy while suffering minimal casualties ourselves.

However, a successful operation has now turned into sheer heroism. If we have the forces to repel the enemy and secure our supply lines, then such actions would be logical. If.

Success in war means achieving a favorable position — tactically, operationally, and strategically — while inflicting significantly greater losses on the enemy than on ourselves. At present, we have lost both the tactical and operational advantages in Kursk region.

Decisive action is needed.

It is also crucial to immediately establish a unified command and coordination center for UAV and electronic warfare operations in the “Siversk” operational zone. This center should be led by a competent commander — one from an active and combat-ready UAV unit, as was done in Pokrovsk in the “Donetsk” operational zone. In high-tech warfare, drone operations must be managed by leaders who excel in UAV deployment, not just bureaucrats who enjoy watching live streams on TV. Our army has such skilled drone warfare commanders — one example is Robert Brovdi. The only issue is ensuring that these commanders are appointed, granted real authority, and empowered to make operational and tactical decisions.

Yuriy Butusov

Ukraine Front Lines