The situation on the Pokrovsk front is critically urgent and demands systematic and measured decisions from the High Command, Yuriy Butusov informs.
In the past week, the enemy has advanced 6 km towards Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk. On a narrow front, with flanks under fire, they have managed to advance. Myrnohrad is now only 14 km away. With Myrnohrad within range of long-range artillery, if the enemy enters Myrnohrad, they will gain a concentration and accumulation zone and will be able to attack Pokrovsk itself. The Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration is the last defense area before the Dnipropetrovsk region. The enemy is very close, and the situation is critical due to the rapid pace of their advance.
According to commanders and fighters defending the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, the main issue under the intense conditions is the management and organization of our actions.
Russian command attacks primarily the brigades with the weakest management and organization, those with poor control and cohesion. The enemy seeks out and pushes through not the most vulnerable defensive lines, but the most vulnerable units and formations.
When a poorly managed brigade is attacked, it cannot even hold a narrow front. Therefore, all marching reinforcements and reserves are sent to strengthen the weak units suffering the highest losses. This prevents the creation of significant tactical reserves that could undergo additional training, more frequently rotate soldiers at the front, and build second and third defensive lines.
The lack of prepared defensive positions, reliable fortifications occupied by troops, prevents stopping the enemy at any line. The situation is essentially a continuous engagement, with soldiers digging in during the advance.
The Russians are attacking in a patterned and predictable manner. They conduct frontal assaults with small infantry groups, suffering high losses. Their advance is very difficult, and they also send all available personnel into battle, with units being depleted to the last man. The main axis of advance is along the railway line, where it is convenient to dig in and conceal oneself in the vegetation. Everyone understands this, but turning this route into an impassable obstacle with engineering means has not yet been achieved.
A critical issue is the lack of unified competent leadership over all drone forces and electronic warfare (EW) assets, which continue to be used in a scattered and uncoordinated manner. Our own EW is destroying a significant number of our drones. Drone units receive tasks without considering tactical and technical capabilities.
I cannot say that the Ukrainian command is unaware of or does not understand the critical nature of the situation. Much is being done, and no commanders are sitting idle. The Commander-in-Chief O. Syrsky is paying personal attention.
However, we are clearly lagging in our response…
There is a lack of coordinated brigade headquarters, logic in the application of troops and ammunition…
Attempts to deploy a large number of units to a specific area without a unified, clear logic of application are ineffective.
Why do inexperienced brigade commanders and weak brigade headquarters continue to lead while the ground forces command holds in reserve dozens of experienced commanders with reputations earned in tough battles of 2022-2023? How is this explained? Why is the staffing problem not being addressed, even though everyone sees it as the main issue, and experienced personnel are available?
Systematic solutions are needed, and we must stop deceiving ourselves. The command echelon needs urgent strengthening.
Tags: Myrnohrad pokrovsk direction
