Strike of an Iskander on the 168th Reserve Battalion: what happened, who is responsible, and how to prevent recurrences?

On March 1, at 15:20, a ballistic “Iskander-M” missile, guided by an enemy drone, struck the location of the 168th Reserve Battalion of the Operational Command “East” near the village of Cherkaske in the Dnipropetrovsk region. According to sources, up to 39 Ukrainian soldiers were killed, and up to 90 were wounded.

What is the 168th Reserve Battalion?

It is a military unit of the ground forces under the Operational Command “East,” tasked with redistributing personnel between various military units. The command of the battalion consists of a permanent staff, while most of the personnel are temporarily assigned to the battalion. At the time of the strike, there were many hundreds of soldiers stationed there. Combat training is not conducted. The unit is essentially a tent camp in an open area near the 239th land forces training ground, about 130-140 km from the front line. The tents are placed quite close together and are not camouflaged from aerial surveillance. While a significant portion of the tents are dug in, there are no bunkers, and all the tents lack overhead protection. The part of the camp where meetings and formations are held is also not protected. There was a large parking area with dozens of vehicles near the camp. The personnel constantly rotated in and out, and there was ongoing movement.

What is the need to keep a large number of people in one poorly equipped and poorly protected place?

The main method of personnel transfer within Ukraine’s defense forces is chaotic and poorly organized, primarily through spontaneous departures from military units. Because in most cases, it is not possible to transfer units properly within the military. No changes to Army+ have completely resolved these issues. Unauthorized abandonment of units is no longer a criminal offense, so anyone who left service early for various reasons, or wishes to transfer without the unit’s command’s consent, ends up in the reserve battalion, leading to overcrowding. The battalion is filled mostly with soldiers who left or are being transferred due to administrative issues. Military personnel constantly arrive for transfers, and every day, “buyers” – representatives from units authorized to select personnel – show up. Consequently, there are constant gatherings and formations. People arrive, are counted, are gathered for communication with recruiters, and move around independently. There is constant vehicle traffic. Maintaining order is extremely difficult. Many of the soldiers are motivated, but there is a large portion that is unmotivated and undisciplined. Some stay in tents for several days, while others remain for two months. There are regular raids to check for illegal alcohol, occasional fights, and constant trips to nearby settlements. There is no military justice in Ukraine, so discipline and order in the crowd are controlled by a small number of commanders, which is insufficient for these circumstances. The military command at all levels consistently monitored the battalion’s activities and was aware of all the existing problems.

How is Air Defense and Air Cover of the camp organized?

Airspace protection is provided by the Air Command “East.” Russian reconnaissance drones fly over these areas constantly, daily, and there are often alerts about potential missile attacks. Some of the reconnaissance drones can be spotted and intercepted, while others are not. Occasionally, warnings about drone flights are not issued to ground forces. However, on March 1, a Russian drone was detected, and efforts were made to track and destroy it, but they were unsuccessful. This Russian drone operated in the Dnipropetrovsk region for about 6 hours, but despite the duration, it was not shot down.

The 168th Reserve Battalion was not the primary target of this reconnaissance but was one of the planned objects of surveillance. The missile strike was likely triggered by the enemy observing the formations and the gathering of people as they dispersed after the formation. At 15:07, the Air Command “East,” according to sources from Censor.net in the Air Forces, issued a warning about the threat of a missile attack, and information about the drone’s flight was also communicated.

Why was it not possible to avoid heavy losses?

Due to frequent drone flights and warnings about missile attacks, most military units do not react to them. Soldiers who were present at the 168th battalion’s location during the attack told Censor.net that the unit continued operating as usual even during the warnings. The movement of people was not restricted during the alerts, no command to take shelter was issued, and there was no dispersal of personnel. Formations and gatherings continued as usual. The majority of people were in tents that were unprotected from above, or they were moving around the camp, while some were at the assembly area. The Russian missile was equipped with a cluster munition warhead, which covered a large area.

Who is responsible?

Attacks on deployment points occur regularly. However, even in the fourth year of the war, it is still impossible to guarantee the safety of the troops and avoid heavy losses. The reason for this is the fundamental irresponsibility for the lives of the personnel on the part of the military leadership at all levels. Orders are issued that are not properly controlled or contradict other orders that are also given. There should be questions raised about everyone who was in charge and oversaw the organization of the 168th Reserve Battalion’s service, including the Operational Command East, the command of the Ground Forces, Air Command East, and the Air Force Command. Currently, all the blame is being placed solely on the battalion commander, who has been removed from his position.

What should be done to avoid such tragedies in the future?

1. Prohibit mass gatherings of people that cannot be masked or organized in a concealed manner, especially in areas where enemy drones constantly fly. In other words, all training and reserve camps designed to accommodate thousands of people should be relocated at least 400-500 km from the front line.
2. Strengthen the air defense of frontline areas with radars and interceptor drones to improve the density and effectiveness of measures against enemy drones. A 6-hour flight of a drone over our rear is unacceptable, and there are sufficient means now to intercept these drones.
3. Military formations in the frontline zone must be provided with shelters as a mandatory requirement. Troops must disperse to avoid mass gatherings, particularly when they occur repeatedly in the same location.
4. Improved interaction between ground and air forces regarding drone flight warnings, and ensuring the safety of personnel, should be the primary tasks for commanders at all levels. The leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces must implement an After Action Review procedure to quickly analyze the reasons for significant personnel losses outside of criminal investigations and make immediate changes to the organization of military service. After three years of war, attacks on deployment points have occurred regularly, and several times these have led to heavy casualties. It is time to make systematic conclusions and take preventive measures to avoid large, simultaneous losses, which can be achieved with basic actions.
5. Responsibility for violations of personnel safety regulations and orders should not only fall on direct commanders but, most importantly, on the higher-level commanders and leaders who are responsible for organizing and overseeing military units’ activities.

Yuriy Butusov

Tags: investigation Russia russia ukraine war Ukraine war