Putin’s Nord Stream gas flows: The Ukrainian connection—what are WSJ storytellers and investigators keeping quiet about?

Part 1.

The latest installment of the media series by The Wall Street Journal about Ukraine’s involvement in the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines added little new information, aside from repeating some well-known names, such as the President of Ukraine and the former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The ongoing “development” of the Ukrainian connection increasingly reminds me of the 2002 “Kolchuga-gate” scandal, where attempts were made to discredit Ukraine by alleging secret deliveries of Kolchuga radar stations to Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Kolchugas were never found, yet the allegations were presented as fact, leading to Ukraine’s political isolation.

Unlike the one-time “Kolchuga-gate,” the current attempt to discredit Ukraine by linking it to the sabotage of Russian gas pipelines seems designed for repeated, adaptable use, to be deployed as needed. Overall, it can be said that there has been a smooth evolution from “Zalu-gate” (where the main “culprit” was portrayed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, with President Zelensky allegedly unaware of the operation) to the current “Zelen-gate,” where it is now claimed that the President was informed, but the military disobeyed his orders to halt the operation and carried it out regardless.

I will not analyze the absurdity of the Ukrainian connection from the perspectives of organizational and technical aspects of conducting high-level underwater sabotage operations. This has been addressed in my previous articles in Mirror of the week, on the website of the Center for Strategic XXI, and in numerous radio and television broadcasts, among other sources. Many foreign experts have also expressed skepticism on this topic.

One point worth noting is the type of explosive used, which has been mentioned before and has appeared again in the recent disclosures. This explosive is octogen, which is significantly more powerful compared to hexogen. Octogen is primarily used for loading cumulative charges in various types of munitions. When combined with the appropriate plasticizer, it is used by specialized units for sabotage operations.

What is not mentioned in the publication (and not only in this one) is which specific modification of octogen was used (octol or okfol) and how the explosive device (ED) was constructed, especially since one version suggests that one of the devices was lost somewhere in a Swedish port and was to be found eventually. Why is this important? Because the type of explosive and the design of the device narrow down the search and provide more precise clues about the potential perpetrators and how the devices were obtained.

The production of octogen, unlike the manufacture of TNT or hexogen, is not very widespread. In the US, there is only one producer: Holston Army Ammunition Plant in Kingsport, Tennessee; in Norway, it is Chemring Nobel; in France, it is EURENCO. Poland also has some minor production lines for octogen, one owned by the private company Jakusz near Gdańsk, and the other by PGZ “NITRO-CHEM” in Bydgoszcz. In Russia, the ONLY producer of octogen is the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Y.M. Sverdlov Plant” in Dzerzhinsk near Nizhny Novgorod. Unfortunately, Ukraine does not produce octogen or any other specialized chemicals.

Since the authors of the Ukrainian connection narrative avoid addressing the type of octogen and the design of the explosive device (ED), I will not elaborate further on this aspect. We will simply wait for the versions from the storytellers by the Potomac or the Spree. With each transformation of the Ukrainian connection theory, we get closer to deciphering the real instigators.

By the way, the Kremlin’s führer dismisses the Ukrainian connection to the pipeline sabotage. On March 14, 2023, in an interview with Russia-1, he stated: “I am certain that this is complete nonsense. An explosion of this kind, of this magnitude, at such a depth, can only be carried out by specialists, supported by the full might of a state with certain technologies.” He then, as usual, pointed the finger at the US.

At this point, it is important to understand why this topic has resurfaced now. More will follow in Part 2.

Putin’s pipelines / Sabotage / (Non-)Ukrainian connection?

Part 2

1. I previously noted that the “Ukrainian connection” seems to be an attempt by certain circles to package the narrative in such a way that the US, Europe, Britain, and… Russia are all exonerated from involvement in the sabotage. The New York Times reported: “Some initial US and European assumptions focused on the possibility of Russian involvement, particularly given its expertise in underwater operations, though it is unclear what motivation the Kremlin would have for blowing up the pipelines, given that they were an important source of revenue and a means for Moscow to exert influence over Europe… US representatives say they have found no evidence of Russian government involvement in the attack… US officials have stated that no Americans or Britons were involved.” Reports indicated that American intelligence failed to find evidence linking Russia to the incident. The British Times on March 8, 2023, revealed that by a week after the sabotage, it was already known in the West that the perpetrators were not Russia or the US, but a private Ukrainian enterprise. It is also worth recalling that by the end of 2022, Western media had already reported, citing “some Western officials,” “numerous officials,” and “23 diplomats and intelligence officers from nine countries,” that a several-month investigation had not confirmed Russian involvement in the sabotage, without mentioning any other potential culprits.
2. I suspect that there are no real results from the investigation (as the Russian version was dismissed supposedly due to lack of motive), or that the results will not be made public, as it is preferable for the narrative to be “the war in Ukraine” rather than “the war in Europe,” as they might perceive it. Evidence of Russian involvement in the sabotage would necessitate harsh actions, potentially leading to “escalation” and possibly “NATO’s war with Russia.” Hence, the narrative of a Ukrainian group, initially given a sort of “indulgence” by the Ukrainian government, emerges. The implication is that non-state actors in times of hybrid warfare are capable of even more. The latest modification of the version now suggests that President Zelensky was aware of the operation, approved it, but later attempted to stop it, though unsuccessfully. Thus, the authors of the version still afford Zelensky a degree of “indulgence.” Although official representatives in both the US and European capitals have not agreed with the “Ukrainian version,” it appears that influential figures on both sides of the Atlantic are keen to implement a “special operation to coerce parties into peace.” This might at least involve a temporary ceasefire, which could be presented as a diplomatic success.
3. Russia’s message is roughly this: “We have known for a long time who was behind the sabotage, but we will not officially disclose that the operation was orchestrated by the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research of the Russian Ministry of Defense and two special units of the Baltic Fleet. Similarly, you should stop accusing us. In the end, the investigation will likely fail to definitively determine the authorship, and you will not insist on accusations against us.” At the same time, the media-driven “Ukrainian connection” serves as a signal to Kyiv. The message is: “We do not currently see official Ukrainian involvement in the sabotage, but further investigation might uncover certain evidence (hinting at a case similar to the ‘Kolchuga’ scandal of 2002), and potential ‘witnesses’ to the preparation and execution of the sabotage might emerge. Politico, on March 12, 2023, wrote about ‘points of tension’ between Washington and Kyiv, mentioning, among other issues, the ‘pipeline sabotage.’ Now, there are even more details suggesting that the names of the perpetrators are known and being sought by the German prosecutor’s office. Therefore, it is better to come to the negotiating table with the Russians on a broad range of issues.”
4. A broad range of issues includes a ceasefire and, as a first step, an agreement to refrain from targeting critical energy infrastructure (CEI). Here, the most crucial aspect is the confirmation of information reported by the Washington Post, which has been circulating since July about negotiations in Qatar supposedly mediated by Doha. In reality, Qatar was presented with an idea from Washington and asked to present it as its own initiative. This month, Ukraine and Russia were supposed to send delegations to Doha to negotiate an agreement that would halt attacks on energy infrastructure from both sides. The idea itself is logical. However, there is a problem. These are Ukrainian attacks on occupied territories that the occupier considers as its “new regions.” It is unlikely that Qatar would make an exception, as this would effectively mean that Moscow acknowledges the fact of occupying the neighboring country’s territories. For Russia, this is, of course, unacceptable. Similarly, our demand to free the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and return it under Ukrainian control remains a sticking point. Given the operational situation, Russia might agree to some vague, ambiguous formulations to facilitate an agreement and then, at the opportune moment, strike at our CEI, arguing that Ukraine did not adhere to the terms of the agreement. This suggests that we cannot agree to such a deal. However, the Biden administration may be eager to push this through, as they need some intermediate results to demonstrate the effectiveness of their “diplomacy at the table” approach to ending the “war in Ukraine.”

Michael Honchar 

Tags: nord stream nord stream 2 Russia russia ukraine war Ukraine