Over the past few weeks, Sumy region — where intense fighting had not occurred for a long time — has been appearing almost daily in DeepState map updates.
“The enemy has occupied Andriivka and Vodolahy.”
“The enemy’s advance in Sumy region continues.”
“The enemy has occupied Loknia.”
The withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region led not only to the loss of control over Russian territory but also over Ukrainian territory.
In recent months, Russia has occupied up to a dozen small villages along the Sumy border and is trying to reach three settlements important for the logistics of the Defense Forces: Yunakivka, Pysarivka, and Khotin.
Alongside its advance along the border, Russia regularly and chaotically shells Sumy, killing civilians. On June 3, it reached the city with rocket artillery for the first time — likely having moved it right up to the border.
There is minimal public information about the real situation in the Sumy region, especially from the military — the General Staff, the “Kursk” troop command, and the “Siversk” operational-tactical group.
First, the General Staff still calls this direction the Kursk front, although for a couple of months now it has obviously been the Sumy front. It is not Ukraine advancing toward Kursk, but Russia — as painful as it is to admit — advancing into the Sumy region (for now, it is difficult for us to say whether Sumy itself is the actual target).
Second, on the daily General Staff maps, none of the villages in the Sumy region that have fallen under occupier control are marked in red, meaning “captured,” despite there being about a dozen according to DeepState and our military sources. Some of these villages were lost back in March and April.
Journalists are prohibited from working with the military in the Sumy region. While looking for interviewees for this article, we received about two dozen refusals. None of those who did agree wanted to speak under their real names.
In this article, Ukrainska Pravda tells what has happened in the Sumy region since the Defense Forces withdrew from the Kursk region, what the current situation is in the enemy-occupied area near the border, and how the approaching frontline is affecting Sumy itself.
What happened after the withdrawal of the Defense Forces from Kursk Oblast
After most Ukrainian forces withdrew from the Kursk region in mid-March, the Defense Forces launched two more daring offensives — in Belgorod Oblast and in the directions of Tyotkino and Vesyoloye in Kursk Oblast.
To storm Russian territory, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi deployed, among others, his reserves — the 225th and 425th Assault Battalions. The latter, better known as “Skala,” recently formed the first motorcycle company in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
We don’t know the maximum objective for the advance in Belgorod region, but in the area of Tyotkino and Vesyoloye, the Defense Forces, according to the military, were supposed to reach as far as the village of Glushkovo — more than 10 kilometers deep into enemy territory.
According to one of the commanders who took part in the operation, the task was unrealistic from the start. Primarily because of the severe shortage of personnel in the consolidation units — those who were supposed to hold the defense after the assaults by the 225th and 425th battalions.
One of our sources, when asked the clarifying question, “Are you advancing on Tyotkino?” replied, “We are walking right into the same trap again,” meaning they keep launching offensives without the capacity to hold the ground afterward.
“I heard that the command is trying to create a buffer zone, but with the resources we currently have, it’s practically impossible. Moreover, fighting on their own territory, the Russians are putting in more effort than they do on ours. There are constant assaults here — constant.
That’s why I think these maneuvers were more of a political move — we wanted to demonstrate our presence on Russian territory. Perhaps to help the Commander-in-Chief save face, perhaps to have leverage during negotiations,” shares one of the commanders currently fighting in the Sumy region in a conversation with Ukrainska Pravda.
As far as Ukrainska Pravda knows, the offensive actions in both Belgorod and Kursk regions did not yield the desired results. In the Tyotkino direction, where the Defense Forces had some partial success, the assaults have also stopped.
“The Russians brought in elite airborne troops, and some of our units refused to take positions to hold the flanks. And our battalion has been worn down by a month of assaults, so now we’re mostly on the defensive,” one of the soldiers who took part in the Tyotkino offensive told UP.
Even before the full withdrawal of the Defense Forces from the Kursk region and the start of new offensives on Russian territory, the occupiers began assaulting the Sumy region and gradually expanded their zone of control. At first, they moved south from the border — into the Yunakivka area — and then began expanding westward, toward Bilovody, Vodolahy, and other locations.
A Sumy native, an officer from the 17th Heavy Mechanized Brigade, expressed surprise — and, to some extent, frustration — in a conversation with Ukrainska Pravda that the public only became aware of the Russian advance in the Sumy region in May–June. After all, the Russian army began putting pressure on the first border villages — Novenke, Zhuravka, and Basivka — as early as late winter and early spring.
On March 13, during the withdrawal of the Defense Forces from the Kursk region, UP was working just a few kilometers from the border and heard from local soldiers that Russians had already “raced in” on quad bikes into Basivka. Basivka is the second village from the border.
“Everyone thinks the Russians did this in a week, but it’s actually been going on since mid-February. DeepState just didn’t update that section for a long time. But the overall trend didn’t change — they kept advancing. For example, they were already on the outskirts of Loknya around early May, if not earlier — and that village is just two streets stretching about 1.5 kilometers (on the DeepState map it’s marked as occupied by Russians as of June 7),” the servicemember from the 17th Brigade told UP.
Over the past three months, the Russian army has captured around a dozen tiny and small villages along the border northeast of Sumy. According to DeepState, the total area of occupied territory in the Sumy region amounts to nearly 200 square kilometers. For comparison, that’s about one-fifth of the area of the Kursk region that Ukraine managed to seize during its offensive last summer. Why the occupiers were able to do this, and what is currently happening in the captured area, we will describe below.
Before that, it’s worth mentioning that DeepState also marks two tiny areas south of Yunakivka — near Sadky and Oleksandriya — in red, meaning under Russian control. However, we currently have no information about these areas.
Two servicemen holding the defense in the Myropillya direction — a village about 30 kilometers from Sumy — told UP that for some time now, they have been observing a buildup of Russian forces on the other side of the border, near the Russian village of Gornal.
“Whether this is a case of them trying to divert our attention, or whether they’re actually preparing for an offensive — it’s too early to tell. If they come toward our direction with the same number of troops as they did in Yunakivka, there’s a chance their scenario could repeat itself here. There’s a problem with fortifications, and you can’t stay in houses for long — they’ll be taken apart by glide bombs (KABs); there’s also the issue of the vulnerability of supply routes,” said a serviceman from the Myropillya direction.
“If the Russians start pushing toward Sumy from that side — Sadky, Myropillya — it could be a problem. There are a lot of forests there, and now everything is green — once someone dashes into the trees, you can’t see them. From intercepted communications, we know they’ve sent four new units to the Sumy region,” adds the senior sergeant of one of the UAV units operating in Sumy.
Also, as we understand from our conversations with the military, it is currently crucial not to let the Russians enter another dense forest area located south of Khotin and Pysarivka. Driving the enemy out of a vast “green zone” that conceals everything from movements to dugouts is extremely difficult. Forests also make it hard to use FPV drones, as the trees interfere with radio signal transmission.
Essentially, if we let the Russians into the forest near Khotin and Pysarivka, we’ll end up with a second Serebryansky forest — or possibly an even tougher battlefield, since the forest in Sumy is broad-leaved and full of deep ravines.
What’s happening in the zone of active Russian offensive
While preparing this text, we encountered two fundamentally different perspectives on the current Russian advance along the border and in the Yunakivka area — from civilians and from the military.
Most of our civilian interlocutors in Sumy share a similar view: there is no major Russian breakthrough in the Sumy region, and there’s no heavy equipment in the captured villages that could reach the city, so the risks shouldn’t be exaggerated. For now, the city itself is not under threat.
At the same time, nearly all servicemen holding the defense along the border and in the Yunakivka area — as well as those commanding the units, including airborne and border troops — are far less optimistic. They described the situation to us as “difficult,” “critical,” “chaotic,” and a “complete mess.”
They lack personnel, especially skilled FPV crews, fiber-optic drones, fortifications, prepared positions, early mine-laying, and effective coordination between units — all essential for a proper defense.
The Ukrainian villages of Khotin and Pysarivka, located along the main road between Yunakivka and Sumy, are, in the opinion of the soldiers we spoke with, entirely attainable targets for the Russians.
How were the Russians able to advance so successfully in the Sumy region over the past few months?
First, several of the most combat-ready brigades were pulled from the Russian offensive zone along the border and Yunakivka — some were sent to the offensive near Tyotkino, others to Donetsk region, where the Russians are likely to launch their main strike this summer.
In their place, the “Kursk” military group was assigned weaker newly formed units. One such brigade, as Ukrainska Pravda knows, entered the Sumy region without any real combat experience and with a minimal number of their own drones.
“We need reserves, we need strong FPV crews,” explains an experienced fighter from one of the airborne brigades to UP.
On the Russian side, one of the most effective enemy UAV units, “Rubikon,” is actively operating in the Sumy direction. It focuses on disrupting logistics and shooting down reconnaissance drones and bombers. According to Ukrainian pilots’ observations, the Russians now strike most targets using drones with optical guidance.
Second, our interlocutors in four units that were positioned in the areas now occupied by the Russians—or are well informed about them—unanimously agree: along the border near Khotin, Pysarivka, and Yunakivka, there was no continuous defensive line. Only isolated trenches and dugouts.
Ukraine did not use the time during the Kursk operation to strengthen its border defenses in the Sumy region.
“When we were on Russian positions, we were very surprised to see that they had trenches 6–8 kilometers long, running underground and all leading to the border, to their checkpoints. They fortified their border very well. And now we’re in Sumy region, and there’s nothing at all… You have to rush to build something yourself. Just the other day, the guys were defending in dugouts that were probably dug back around 2014. Then it rained, and they got flooded up to their waists.
When the battle for Kursk was happening, we could have used our imagination and created an underground defense system in the Sumy region. But nobody did anything. If we had put up wire obstacles over the roads earlier, the situation in Kursk might have developed differently,” — expresses frustration in a conversation with Ukrainska Pravda the chief sergeant of one of the UAV units, who previously fought in Kursk and now operates in Sumy.
“There definitely wasn’t any reinforced concrete there. While it was still possible to build fortifications with machinery at full height, no one did it,” confirms our interlocutor from the 17th brigade.
Third, the nets meant to protect Sumy’s roads from enemy FPV drones were installed far too late. Some sections of the roads still remain uncovered. Even where the nets were set up, there was an issue with 1.5-meter “gaps” between the net and the ground, which occasionally allowed Russian drones to slip under and strike Ukrainian vehicles.
Defense Forces units operating in the Sumy region have begun increasing the time their personnel spend at positions to minimize the risks associated with movement. The days when, for example, UAV operators could come to work for just a day are now in the past.
Are the Russians planning to advance on the city of Sumy itself?
None of our sources could give a definitive answer to this question. The only thing they are certain of is that the occupiers are currently doing everything they can to stretch the frontline in the Sumy region in order to force Ukraine’s Defense Forces to redeploy more reserves to the area. In particular, Russian forces are heavily attacking in the directions of two villages – Pysarivka and Yunakivka. Capturing Pysarivka would allow the occupiers to cut the main road connecting Sumy to Yunakivka, while taking Yunakivka itself would give them control over a key border settlement.
The Russians are now just 5 kilometers away from Pysarivka, and they are already on the outskirts of Yunakivka. Border guards flying drones over Yunakivka recorded Russian incursions into the village center on motorcycles on June 7–8. On June 10, Ukrainian open-source analysts DeepState, who update their map with some delay, marked roughly one-third of Yunakivka as a “grey zone.”
According to military sources cited by Ukrainska Pravda, there is currently no heavy equipment on the portion of the Sumy region captured by Russian forces. The heaviest weapon spotted so far has been a mortar. The occupiers are advancing in small assault groups and spending most of their time holed up in houses across the occupied villages. No drone launch sites have been identified in the area as of yet.
Recently, the Russians—like the Ukrainian army—have begun operating heavy night bombers and using ground-based robotic systems to deliver ammunition, food, and to transport the aforementioned mortar.
Is there a threat to the city of Sumy?
Since the start of mandatory evacuations in 2023, some 55,000 people have been evacuated from villages and towns in the Sumy region, including 8,000 children. In 60 settlements along the border, practically all residents have been evacuated.
As for the city of Sumy itself—which now lies just 20 kilometers from the front line (similar to Kramatorsk)—there are currently no grounds for evacuation. That’s according to Oleg Hryhorov, the newly appointed head of the regional military administration. In a phone conversation with Ukrainska Pravda, Hryhorov assured that the city has a full evacuation plan, with several designated routes in place, ready to be used if necessary.
However, for now, he insists there is no such need. He is confident that the Defense Forces will not allow Russian troops to approach the regional center.
“We understand that the situation on the front line is difficult, but it remains under control by our Armed Forces. We also understand that, beyond the fighting on the battlefield, the enemy is trying to spread panic. I’m convinced that the June 3rd strike was both a Russian terrorist attack against civilians and an attempt to intensify panic. I have 100% trust in our Armed Forces and no doubt about their combat readiness and capabilities. They are doing their job with dedication,” said Hryhorov.
On the morning of June 3, the Russian army struck cars waiting at a traffic light in the center of Sumy, killing three people on the spot. Three more victims of the attack—a 17-year-old teenager, an 86-year-old woman, and a 43-year-old man—died later in the hospital. The man’s daughter, 7-year-old Masha, who had a shrapnel wound in her lung, was transferred to the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv.
Local media, the regional military administration, and later the president initially reported that, according to preliminary information, the Russians had shelled the city with long-range rocket artillery. On social media, residents of Sumy and journalists speculated that it might have been something like the Russian Tornado MLRS, which has a range of up to 120 kilometers. The implication was that no new threat to the city had emerged—so there was no need to escalate concerns.
However, that may not be the case.
Sources in one of Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies told Ukrainska Pravda, and this was later confirmed by the Prosecutor General’s Office, that according to preliminary information, the June 3 strike on Sumy was not carried out with a Tornado, but with a BM-21 Grad, which has an effective range of 20 kilometers—or up to 40 kilometers in certain cases.
The occupiers used a 122-millimeter extended-range rocket—specifically the 9M521—in the strike on the city center. This is an unguided, imprecise rocket with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead, typically used against exposed or sheltered infantry, unarmored, or lightly armored vehicles. These rockets are loaded into either a BM-21 Grad or a Tornado-G, which is a modernized version of the Grad. A Grad can fire up to 40 rockets in a single salvo, and each rocket contains roughly a thousand primary fragments. The maximum range of this type of rocket is 40 kilometers.
According to Ukrainska Pravda’s sources in law enforcement, the Grad strike was launched from Russian territory. This further confirms that there is no heavy equipment, artillery, or multiple rocket launch systems currently present in the Russian-occupied villages in Sumy Oblast.
If one measures a distance of 30–40 kilometers from the impact site in Sumy on the map, the trajectory suggests the Grad was fired either from the north—from the area around the Russian villages of Sinyak, Kulbaki, and Novoivanovka—or from the east—from the vicinity of Guyevo and Gornali.
What are we trying to say with all this? The Russians managed to bring a Grad launcher dangerously close to the border and open fire from it—while Ukrainian units did not detect or neutralize it in time. This marks a new level of threat for the city of Sumy itself.
On the other hand, rocket artillery strikes on Sumy have not yet become frequent, so the June 3rd attack can likely be seen as another attempt to intimidate the civilian population and pressure Ukraine into making concessions in negotiations. The implied message: “We can now hit Sumy with our MLRS; you risk losing even more if you don’t accept our terms.”
However, even the most massive and painful Russian attacks on Sumy, Kyiv, or any other city are not shifting Ukraine’s red lines. On the contrary, they only strengthen the determination of Ukrainians to keep fighting for their cities.
Lastly, it’s important to note that Russian fiber-optic FPV drones currently do not pose a threat to civilians in Sumy.
The operational range of a Russian FPV drone on a fiber-optic cable is around 15 kilometers, while the distance from the closest Russian positions to Sumy is about 18–20 kilometers. Moreover, the drone’s launch point is typically located well behind the front-line trenches.
“Everyone measures from the grey zone or the edge of occupied territory and says: it’s only 20–25 kilometers to Sumy! But, first of all, the launch point is at least 5 kilometers behind the line of contact—so if Russians are 20–25 kilometers from Sumy, then the drone is actually 35 kilometers away. Secondly, the farther you fly on a fiber-optic line, the lighter your payload. What are you going to carry to the outskirts of Sumy—an F-1 grenade? It won’t cause much damage. So wasting a fiber-optic drone just to scare a civilian in the rear makes no sense,” explains the aforementioned senior sergeant from a UAV unit.
Meanwhile, on their Telegram channels, Russians are already claiming they’re preparing to operate fiber-optic drones with a range of 50 kilometers. If they truly begin deploying them and the technology proves effective, the situation could change. However, such a development would take them at least several months to implement.
“The General Staff has stretched the front. Instead of concentrating its forces in Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk regions, it opted for actions on the Kursk axis, which have now turned into the Sumy operation. To carry out operations on new fronts, we need new forces. The idea that ‘the enemy hits here, and we’ll hit somewhere else to tie up their actions’ doesn’t work, because Russia has more manpower, missiles, and ammunition,” says a high-ranking commander, frustrated by the situation in Sumy and currently short of reinforcements in Donetsk.
He represents a segment of the Ukrainian military convinced that the maneuver in the Kursk region should have been quick—both going in and pulling out. In their view, the offensive in Belgorod and Tyotkino only stretches the Defense Forces thinner, forces that are already severely under-resourced. The Ukrainian army performs well in rapid and bold operations but struggles to maintain prolonged defense.
In both Sumy and Donetsk regions, units are facing the same set of challenges: weak reserves, logistical chains that are neither diversified across transport modes nor well protected, a lack of fortifications or ones inadequate for current needs, and a shortage in both the quantity and quality of drones.
Some of these problems, however, can be solved. And perhaps then, the situation in Sumy would look different.
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