Categories: INVESTIGATIONS

Air power over boots on the ground: NATO, Ukraine, and the future of European security

The best security guarantees are not “boots on the ground” but “wings in the sky,” and without NATO, Europe will not be able to provide them.

Trump wants to end the war quickly, strike a deal, and place the burden of its enforcement on the Europeans, including the deployment of troops. The Americans do not want to take on any additional commitments, so NATO membership for Ukraine is off the table. However, the resulting peace must be solid—at least for the next three years while the current administration is in power. This raises the question of peace guarantees, meaning security guarantees for Ukraine. What could these be, not in abstract terms but concretely?

European ground contingents will not be a sufficient guarantee. Neither the 50,000 troops mentioned by the Western press nor the 200,000 proposed by V. Zelenskyy. First, Europe does not have 200,000 ready combat troops available. Second, they will not be willing to engage in a prolonged infantry war of attrition with guided bombs, drones, artillery shelling, and the corresponding losses. Third, their presence will not be a real deterrent to the Russians, who can field a million-strong ground army.

What can deter a new aggression is the threat of massive long-range strikes against invading forces and the aggressor’s territory. This can be achieved through aircraft and ground-based missile systems.

Ground-based missiles (cruise and/or ballistic) with a range of over 300–500 km, let alone 1,000 km, are practically nonexistent in Europe. The only ones available are sea-based, possessed by the British and French—but it is unlikely they would send missile ships to patrol the Black Sea.

American long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles, originally sea-based, have recently been adapted for ground-based launch systems. As revealed through leaks in the Western press, it was precisely these that V. Zelenskyy referred to in point 4 of the “deterrence package” in the victory plan presented last autumn.

Would the Americans be willing to deploy them in Ukraine? Unlikely (since they don’t want to get directly involved—see point 1). Would they be ready to transfer them to Ukraine? Also unlikely (due to the risk of escalation). In fact, if necessary, with Tomahawks ranging from 1,700 to 2,500 km, the Americans could strike Moscow or Russian forces in Ukraine from ships in the Mediterranean Sea themselves.

Another category of long-range weapons is aircraft equipped with missiles—such as the British Storm Shadow, the French SCALP, the German Taurus, and the American JASSM. Europe (and the U.S.) has far more of these than ground-based missiles, as NATO’s doctrine is to conduct wars with air superiority.

This is precisely what Ukrainians were crying out for in 2022—“NATO, close the sky over Ukraine!” The experience of the past three years has proven what was already clear back then: without air superiority, a ground war will not be successful. That’s why, for deterrence, 100–200 European aircraft would be far more useful than 100,000–200,000 European infantry troops.

Unlike ground-based long-range missiles, Europe has a substantial number of aircraft. In theory, if we sum up the air fleets of NATO’s European member states (including the UK and Turkey), we get over 1,500 fighter jets in active service—more than the Russian Air Force, which has 1,300 fighters.

However, in practice, Europe might struggle to provide even 10% of its aircraft for Ukraine’s defense. Potential contributions from some willing nations might not be significant simply because they have only a few dozen fighters: Norway (32 fighters in service), Denmark (35), Finland (54), the Netherlands (32), Belgium (43), Portugal (21)—perhaps only Sweden (71) could offer a more meaningful number.

Poland has 103 fighters, but more than half are outdated Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-22s. Turkey (201) and Greece (178) would likely be ruled out due to political reasons.

The most significant contributions could come from France (185 fighters), the UK (144), Italy (139), Spain (137), and Germany (192). Together, that’s 797—almost 800 fighter jets! Moreover, four of these countries (except France) primarily operate the same aircraft model—the Eurofighter, which simplifies logistics.

Let’s assume the Europeans agree to provide 20–25% or at least 10% of their fighters to protect Ukraine. However, Europe does not have the necessary infrastructure to support such independent operations without the U.S.—satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, and intelligence capabilities—especially at the scale required for such a large operation. So even if Europe provides its air fleet, it would still need U.S. operational support. The simplest and most practical way to achieve this is within NATO—meaning a NATO-led air operation to protect Ukrainian airspace.

The U.S. contribution could also be direct—after all, they have 200 aircraft stationed in Europe—but they are reluctant to get involved. However, the U.S. could reinforce Ukraine’s Air Force by transferring F-16s, of which they have over 1,000 in storage across various modifications. If the U.S. supplied an additional 100 F-16s to Ukraine, it would reduce the number of European fighters needed on Ukrainian airfields. This administration might not want to provide these jets as aid—but what if Ukraine buys them? With European funding, as Mark Rutte suggested.

Not all these aircraft would necessarily have to be stationed in Ukraine—some could be deployed nearby, on airbases in Poland and Romania.

The fundamental issue, however, is the mandate or the rules of engagement. The key question: Would these aircraft be authorized to launch long-range retaliatory strikes on Russian territory? Or would this be strictly an air policing mission to enhance Ukraine’s air defense? Perhaps with limited strikes on Russian forces inside Ukraine?

If Ukraine is not a NATO member, this would be an operation outside NATO territory. Thus, an attack on European aircraft over Ukrainian airspace—or on Ukrainian airfields—would not automatically be considered an attack on NATO states under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

But if these aircraft strike targets inside Russia, would Russia retaliate against NATO territory in response? And if that happens, Article 5 kicks in. If European and American security guarantees for Ukraine are serious, they must be prepared for this scenario—but that’s not a given.

Ultimately, this raises a logical question:

If NATO provides security guarantees for Ukraine and defends Ukrainian airspace—why not make Ukraine an official contributor to NATO’s own security?

In other words, why not simply admit Ukraine to NATO?

Which is exactly the point that needed proving.

Dmytro Shulga