The military had no document stating that Russia’s invasion would begin on February 24, 2022 – Naiev

The decision to use the Armed Forces triggers a chain of preparation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations to repel aggression. Until these decisions are made, the Armed Forces can only plan – Naiev.

About how the tool for protecting sovereignty and independence, the Armed Forces, operates, what laws it follows, and what their readiness to be used to repel aggression depends on, about how the general took over the powers, meaning he acted on his own initiative, with the support of verbal orders from Zaluzhnyi. Also, about trials of generals during wartime and clear signs of politicians preparing for elections that “cannot happen.”

How it happened

To recall the preparation for Russia’s full-scale invasion and understand whether the Ukrainian military had the necessary tools for proper defense, Ukrainska Pravda spoke with Lieutenant General Serhiy Naiev. At the time of the invasion, he held the position of Commander of the Joint Forces of Ukraine’s Defense.

A year ago, Naiev was dismissed from his position and found out about it from the news. After that, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov invited him for a meeting and offered to remain in the Defense Forces to carry out various tasks.

Did the military know about the date of Russia’s invasion? Were decisions made in time to organize the defense? How the battles for Voznesensk became a turning point in the battle for the south, and is there any point in talking about demining Chonhar? Read more in the interview with Ukrainska Pravda.

“In April 2021, the political leadership was informed about the readiness of the Armed Forces to defend.”

– Let’s go back to the preparation for the large-scale war. Western media and allies talked about a possible full-scale invasion as early as spring 2021. Could you please tell us what the atmosphere was like in the Armed Forces back then? How did you prepare for the potential invasion?

– To understand the preparation process of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Defense Forces, it is important to know how this process occurs in accordance with the legislation. In 2019, the final stage of reform took place in the Armed Forces. In 2021, the Strategic Defense Bulletin was released.

This bulletin outlines, in a schematic way, who controls the Armed Forces, which segments of the Armed Forces perform which actions, and what the ultimate application of the Armed Forces of Ukraine should be.

The law on defense clearly stipulates what happens in peacetime and what happens in wartime. Article 4 of this law specifies that in the event of armed aggression against Ukraine or the threat of an attack, the president makes three decisions.

The first – the use of the Armed Forces, the second – the introduction of martial law, and the third – the declaration of mobilization.

– What is meant by the decision to use the Armed Forces of Ukraine?

– It is an order to military commanders to open the military maps and begin preparations, and then to execute what has been planned.

The General Staff must have a strategic plan for the use of the Armed Forces. And other command bodies must have an operational plan for the course of action in case of preparation and conducting military operations during armed aggression against Ukraine. On these documents, on the main map, the position of troops is marked, not with a solid line, but with a dashed line, indicating the results of certain actions.

The first component of the strategic deployment plan is mobilization. The deadline for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is 45 days. The second component is deployment. A military unit must mobilize at its Permanent Dislocation Point (PDP), and then move to the areas of future combat operations.

Upon arrival in the area of operations, the military open the next map – the engineering support plan. On this map, the plan shows where trenches, defensive lines, and other fortifications should be dug, as well as which objects, bridges, and sections of roads should be mined or destroyed.

Then they take out the next plan – the fire strike plan: how to deploy fire strike means, the air defense plan.

In other words, the decision to use the Armed Forces sets in motion a chain of preparations for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations to repel aggression. Until these decisions are made, the Armed Forces can only plan.

So, in April 2021, excuse me for this detailed explanation, the Armed Forces of Ukraine planned actions in response to possible actions by the aggressor country. They worked out the plans, clarified them, and reported to the leadership in the prescribed manner. But this is just a plan on paper, graphically on the map, and textually in the corresponding explanatory note.

– In July of the same year, Zaluzhnyi was appointed instead of Khomchak. How much did the plans change with his arrival?

– When General Zaluzhnyi came in, the plans for the use of the Armed Forces remained unchanged. The situation in the country or in the Armed Forces does not change with the name of the Commander-in-Chief.

In case of war, there is a set of troops according to peacetime staffing, which, in retrospect, includes 12 general military brigades (each with 3–5 thousand soldiers – UP), as well as the set of troops that increases and becomes part of the Armed Forces due to mobilization.

– From September 2021 to February 2022, global media and partners warned that the invasion would occur in January–February 2022. How would you assess the communication between the top political and top military leadership at that time?

– What I personally saw and witnessed, in the spring of 2021, the president, the supreme commander-in-chief, arrived at the General Staff, where he was briefed on the relevant plans, and he was informed about the actions the Armed Forces had planned.

– As a military person, you probably wouldn’t want to talk about this. But the informational background at the time is often mentioned to the president now. The speech with the barbecue was very symbolic. How did the military view all of this?

– The military are members of Ukrainian society. What was happening in the Ukrainian news segment was perceived just like any other ordinary citizen would perceive it.

– Did you feel that the politicians didn’t believe in the war when they said things like that?

– My leader, General Zaluzhnyi, and I – we are military people. We perceive the legally defined process for preparing the Armed Forces to carry out their tasks as intended. It can’t be that politicians say something, and we just sit back and adopt a thoughtful position. We do our job.

We planned, conducted drills, and held training sessions at the training grounds. Then General Zaluzhnyi issued orders to bring military units in their Permanent Dislocation Points (PDP) to readiness for action.

The military units were not allowed to leave their PDPs. However, actions were taken to receive weapons, military equipment, missiles, ammunition, and to recall soldiers from leave and business trips. In other words, we did everything we could.

– In an ideal world with perfect planning, considering that partners expected the invasion in February, is it correct to understand that martial law should have been introduced around January 2022?

– The law on defense clearly outlines the transition from peacetime to wartime. So, in peacetime, we do things one way, and in wartime, we do them another. But the decisions that precede the onset of wartime are made in peacetime, in advance.

Many civilians think that martial law solves many problems. No, martial law provides powers. But the decision to use the Armed Forces and other military formations gives the order to military leaders and commanders of other formations to act.

Let me explain this in simple terms. A father tells his son: “Go to the store, buy something.” That’s an order. But if the father just gives money, that’s a condition. Then the son will go to the store and buy what’s needed. But if the father only gives the son money but doesn’t give the order about where to go and what to do, the son will have money but won’t buy the bread.

When the full-scale invasion started, no military plan in the General Staff or any military management body could be executed because the troops, due to untimely and incomplete deployment, didn’t occupy the final positions. So, the plans were there, but the combat actions were not carried out according to those plans made in peacetime, but rather based on the actual position of enemy forces. That’s the first point.

The second point: The readiness of the troops for use in peacetime can only be executed in permanent dislocation points and only within the framework of peacetime staffing.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine are a tool for defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence. And this tool is not used by the military alone. Primarily, this tool is managed by Ukraine’s political leaders. This is something everyone should understand.

“Just a few days before the invasion, there was a feeling that trouble was approaching.”

– Let’s move closer to February 23–24. At that time, Western media were running headlines like “In 3–4 days, Kyiv will fall.” How did you perceive them, and what was happening on February 23? Was the introduction of the state of emergency on that day already evidence that the invasion was coming? Or was it too late?

– When I became the Commander of the Defense Forces of Ukraine, I approached the Commander-in-Chief, General Zaluzhny, and asked, “Should we call up the troops and send them to the battle zones?” He replied, “Only by specific orders, by specific instructions.” Then I turned to him, asking to gradually, step by step, move a company, a platoon, a battalion to different fronts – to the Chernihiv direction, to Kharkiv…

On the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, evacuation of the civilian population was already taking place. I saw that this would not pass quietly – there were signs of escalation.

On February 21, I was at the relevant command point, in communication with seven commanders, and I told them, “All available forces, we are moving to the task areas.” I took responsibility, but I acted this way proactively, on my own initiative.

– Did you try to convey the inevitability of escalation to the political leadership?

– That was not my level to convey. I made this decision independently. Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhny helped, sent working groups, and influenced the process. On February 21, regarding the 7 commanders, 7 groupings under my command, I made the decision independently and on my own initiative. But General Zaluzhny also orally allowed the troops to be deployed and mobilized.

Of course, I was reading the news and saw the circumstances. There was a feeling that disaster was approaching.

But the generals I told to deploy the troops also read the legislation. They told me: “Provide written confirmation.” So, on February 23, for those who asked insistently, and for everyone, I signed a written order. I did not have the official authority for this; it was also an independent initiative.

– Is it correct to understand that you did not have access to Ukrainian intelligence data at that point?

– Every day, I received relevant intelligence reports. In general, they indicated that there were no strike groupings around the country. We also remember that the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, who oversees one of our state’s intelligence agencies, mentioned that no strike groupings had been created on any front.

What is the main task of any intelligence agency? It’s not just to say how the offensive will unfold, but to specify the time and date of the invasion, when the enemy will strike. And such information was not available. In Ukrainian document circulation, regarding any military command under the signature of any intelligence leader, there is no document stating that on February 24, 2022, at 4 a.m., direct aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine will occur.

– Western media at that time referred to their intelligence data, which indicated that Ukrainian troops were unprepared and that there would be a failure. Later, they started saying that Zaluzhny didn’t provide Western partners with the data on troop deployments because it was classified information. How true is this?

– Ukrainian legislation prohibits sharing military plans with foreigners of any level. Similarly, they – their plans will never be shown to us. Of course, discussing and sharing anything that is not classified, such communication did take place.

– On February 23, you gave a written order to the commanders. By that point, it was already clear that there would be some escalation. Additionally, Putin recognized the LNR-DNR. What happened in the Ukrainian Armed Forces after your order?

– After this written order, they continued to carry out tasks because we need to understand that the movement of a general military brigade is not a matter of a few hours; it takes a considerable amount of time. They moved to areas where they would later prepare to carry out tasks.

But on the 23rd, no information reached my command post from any official that war would break out tomorrow.

– Not from the GUR, not from the Ministry of Defense, from anyone?

– From no one. I’m the Commander of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. I do not receive written information that war will begin tomorrow. And at my command post, in the evening, around 10 p.m., my head of intelligence, a colonel, receives information from friends through unofficial channels.

His friend sends him the information via a messenger. It’s a conversation between two Russian soldiers, and they are discussing that at 6 a.m. on February 24, their Russian drone will be over a Russian convoy in the Sumy region.

I ask my intelligence chief: “Do you believe this information?” He says, “I cannot confirm or deny it.” With some internal conviction, being caught in the whirlwind of these events, I speak to my commanders, living in the situation as it is. I pick up the phone and tell the 7 commanders again that, in my opinion, at 4 a.m. on the 24th, Russia will launch a large-scale invasion.

I say once again: in order to deploy defense forces in time, it requires months of preparation. What happened in those short terms was, firstly, due to the initiative and independent decisions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Zaluzhny, myself as the Commander of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, and other commanders who demonstrated this initiative.

– That night, on the 23rd, I made the decision to deploy naval mines in the Black Sea waters along the coast of the Mykolaiv and Odesa regions. Without any orders for engagement or the legal regime of martial law. Ukrainian military ships went out to sea on the night of the 23rd to the 24th and laid these minefields.

“To be ready for defense, 200,000 mines should have been placed at Chonhar”

– Did you expect that Russia’s attack would be carried out along the entire front line from all directions?

– The expectation that the invasion would come from all directions was foreseen by the General Staff, who had worked on crisis planning. There was nothing new about this because since 2015–2016, during the operational training of the staff and command bodies, we practiced this scenario. In January, when the General Staff worked on crisis planning, all these directions were also considered. But again, I emphasize, this was planning—what could happen.

– Let’s talk about what was most painful for everyone from the very beginning: what happened in the South?

– In 2014, when the temporary occupation of Crimea occurred, the military was deployed in various directions – in the Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv regions, and also towards Crimea – to take measures for resisting aggression.

On the Crimean front, our troops dug some trenches; there were several brigades, and then they mined five bridges at the isthmus: two on the Arabat Spit, which were blown up using explosive charges. Directly at Chonhar, there were three bridges—two for cars and one railway bridge. Explosives were planted, a little more than 1,500 mines. To be ready for defense, about 200,000 mines should have been placed there.

– But there were no legal grounds for this?

– Correct. This is in reference to 2014. Later, these brigades from the Crimean front moved to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with small units remaining in the south. The leadership of the Armed Forces appealed to introduce at least an anti-terrorist operation regime in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions so that troops could be deployed within the legal framework.

Imagine a military commander coming to the owner of a property complex and saying, “Can I place an artillery battery on your property?” And the owner responds, “On what grounds?”

There were no such decisions even to place these forces. It was denied, and it was stated that there would be no such legal regimes in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.

– One of the most common questions in society: who cleared the mines at Chonhar? Can you tell us what happened at Chonhar, and does this question even make sense?

– There is no sense in this question. This direction was subordinate to the “South” military grouping, and an independent battalion was stationed on this isthmus. And in this battalion, there were military personnel who were responsible for blowing up the bridges. Accordingly, the night before the attack, when I informed the commanders that an attack might happen the next day, I also told the commander of the grouping in this direction to prepare the bridges for detonation. When the attack occurred, those soldiers were supposed to blow up the bridges.

But we need to understand that it wasn’t robots doing the detonations—it was ordinary people, just like you and me. And they had to do it while bombs and rockets were flying.

– What could have been done differently in the south?

– A decision should have been made to use the Armed Forces and introduce a legal regime of martial law. This refers to preparations in the previous years.

By the way, there is a law regulating the conduct of the Joint Forces Operation. It is widely known as the law on the reintegration of Donbas. This law states that in security zones adjacent to the combat zones in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, a special order applies, giving special powers to state authorities and military command bodies to counteract Russia’s armed aggression.

In the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, a decision should have been made similar to the one in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Then, the military command would have dug trenches, laid mines—not one and a half thousand, but hundreds of thousands.

Just before the war, mobilization should have increased the number of troops. Then, there would have been two additional territorial defense brigades in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as reserve corps brigades, mechanized tank units, which would have been provided by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

“Even authoritarian Russia does not judge its generals during war”

– You speak of the military’s feats and political leadership. The trials of generals in the Kharkiv region have been going on for the second week. What is your stance on this?

– It is unacceptable that military leaders are being put on trial during the course of a war.

– When the Russian forces launched a second offensive in the Kharkiv region, there were many questions about the military’s actions. We don’t know whether these actions were professional or not, but there were questions. Now, with the generals being tried, it is argued that they should not be judged by civilian courts. How should one act in such situations? On one hand, there is a need to investigate, but on the other hand, we see the reaction: “Why judge generals during wartime?”

– Is the Russian Federation an authoritarian state?

– Yes, it is.

– The Russian Armed Forces withdrew from the Kharkiv part, the Luhansk part, and the Donetsk region as a result of the Ukrainian army’s counteroffensive in the fall of 2022. Also, in the fall of 2022, Russian troops withdrew from the right bank of the Kherson region. The Ukrainian army entered the territory of the Kursk region. In authoritarian Russia, were their generals and colonels held criminally responsible for such actions? No. During the war, they did not do that. We have the experience of other countries where this also happened.

Please, if there are any claims, including criminal ones, they should be investigated, and answers should be given. But is it appropriate to do this during the war? Why? Is this being done to get the truth, or for other reasons?

– What other reasons could there be?

– I’m not a politician or political scientist. They study such matters, I’m just asking this question myself.

– From a military standpoint, do the accusations against Galushkin, Lapin, and Gorbenko have grounds (the commanders are suspected of negligence, which allowed the enemy to capture part of the Kharkiv region in May 2024 – UP)? What should their course of action have been in the Kharkiv region?

– We need to look back at how the defense was later strengthened. General Galushkin was replaced by General Drapaty. But it wasn’t just that. Additional forces and resources were immediately sent to that direction. These actions were also monitored by the leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. General Oleksandr Syrskyi was present and overseeing this matter.

So, no matter who we appoint, without forces and resources, one person wouldn’t have been able to carry out those tasks.

– Right now, the Ukrainian Defense Forces are retreating on almost all fronts. There are very intense battles, particularly near Pokrovsk. Many are asking how the front can be stabilized. What would you do first?

– There are three relevant components. First: the forces – our soldiers, our servicemen.

They must be a) motivated and b) trained. The training of our soldiers is handled by the command of the branches, types of troops, and special forces. They must prepare and motivate the personnel.

During this training, each soldier must be ready for combat operations. Not as if they are taken directly from a training center and immediately sent to the front line, where they are faced with a situation that is very different from the basic military training.

The second component is weapons. Right now, there is a problem on the front lines with supporting our soldiers with the necessary weapons. Where artillery shells are lacking, support can be provided using drones, FPV drones, or other types of drones. This is because the Ukrainian soldier must be protected.

And the third layer – management. We must fight with stable structures, divisions, and corps, where the commander is simultaneously responsible for both the training of their personnel and their deployment.

– Right now, almost everyone, including the president, is considering peace talks. How do you feel about such discussions, and how does it affect the general morale of the Armed Forces?

– The morale of the Armed Forces is such that every commander, every general, and every soldier strives to accomplish their mission, preserve life on the battlefield in order to continue carrying out the tasks ahead.

As for my attitude towards this, of course, I would like the Ukrainian army to have more resources and greater capabilities, accordingly, to liberate the occupied territories through military means and achieve victory. However, the fact that we are dependent on supplies from partner countries indicates that our capabilities are somewhat limited at the moment.

Will there be an increase in these capabilities in the future? I would be happy about that. But the main task of any commander on the battlefield is to accomplish the mission with the fewest casualties in order to save lives.

– In the current circumstances, how realistic is the main goal that was discussed in 2022–2023 – returning to the 1991 borders?

– We can achieve not only the return to the borders. We can achieve the goal of creating a buffer zone around Ukraine. All the questions lie in the realm of resources.

How does it work? The political goal is determined. The military conducts calculations and submits them to the politicians. In order to return to the 1991 borders, we need this many soldiers, this many rockets, munitions, tanks, artillery guns. Then, if that is met, we can return to the 1991 borders.

– We remember that Zaluzhny’s plan included 17 million shells and everything else. Does the West even have such a resource to provide us with the support?

– What is the Russian economy? It is equal to the economy of Canada. What about the economy of the entire European Union? It significantly surpasses the Russian economy. Therefore, the question is not whether they are capable, but whether they are able to make such a decision.

At the beginning of the war in Ukraine and in repelling the large-scale aggression, we fought for our sovereignty and independence, and what was the paradigm in the West? To prevent Russia from winning and Ukraine from losing.

I emphasize again: if they provide what is necessary to return to the 1991 borders, it will happen.

And the leadership of Ukraine constantly stresses this.

Anna Voloshyna

Tags: Russia russia ukraine war Ukraine war