What will Zelensky choose?To appoint a new negotiator who doesn’t provoke aversion in Ukraine’s most important partner, or to keep Yermak, who clearly won’t deliver any results?

I’m not at all pleased by the fact that Washington’s reluctance to receive Andriy Yermak has become so strong it’s now leaking into the press.

What’s even more concerning is that this isn’t just another quirk of the Trump administration. Even under Biden, Yermak wasn’t exactly welcome. At this point, he’s become equally toxic for both Republicans and Democrats.

I believe this is the result of certain new-age politicians reading too much Machiavelli and deciding that if Ukraine is on the front pages, they must be running the world—without attracting the attention of the orderlies.

But the world turned out to be a bit more complicated than that. Media exposure is fine, but it doesn’t change the fact that your weight equals your actual influence. And it seems to me that at some point, Mr. Andriy somewhat overestimated both his own weight and that of the country he represents.

Those tweets at Biden—”Why aren’t we in NATO yet?” sent from a plane—or mocking the UK’s Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, a proven friend of Ukraine, for his remarks about gratitude, have had consequences.

Because while we are certainly loved and sympathized with, no one will allow themselves to be treated like a doormat. And, in my opinion, Andriy Borysovych failed to sense that mood shift. He overestimated both his own importance and Ukraine’s value to its allies.

I think the first warning bell came when the Trump administration publicly called for Ukraine to recall its ambassador in the U.S. due to the scandal in Pennsylvania. The ambassador was left in place—a show of steel nerves and, perhaps, steel brains. But if the host country doesn’t want your ambassador, then that ambassador cannot be effective. And the decision to keep him, thereby damaging relations with the incoming administration, was, in my opinion, far from the best move.

Now comes the second warning bell—they don’t want Andriy Borysovych himself. And they don’t want him so much that this unwillingness has been pushed into the public domain.

And now the question falls to the President: What will he choose? To appoint a negotiator who doesn’t trigger revulsion in our most critical partner and might actually get results? Or to stick with a friend who clearly won’t?

This is a moment when effectiveness equals survival. To survive, we must be 200% effective.

There’s no other way.

So—will we be?

Sergey Marchenko