The military command system is built on lies and irresponsibility, – Butusov

The methods used by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, to manage the troops cannot hold the front.

In an interview with Radio Liberty, the editor-in-chief of Censor.NET, Yuriy Butusov, listed a set of factors influencing the current situation on the front line.

Not in order of importance, but in terms of their direct impact on the organization and management of combat operations.

First, there is the manual control mode. This is a direct control approach by the Commander-in-Chief himself, who intervenes directly in managing the combat operations of battalions and brigades through Joint Forces Operation (JFO) command structures, operational-tactical command, and brigade commanders. A similar approach of intervention and bypassing the entire command chain also exists within the JFO command. Unfortunately, this has led to chaos and a manual control mode, with no systematic approach in place.

Second, there is chaos in personnel management. Syrskyi continuously reshuffles commanders. Some brigades have had their brigade commanders replaced up to six times. Battalion commanders are constantly rotated as well. There is no logic or common sense in this process. Recently, I’ve cited examples where two commanders of the 24th Brigade were dismissed within two months, and a third was appointed. Two individuals with solid reputations—Ivan Holishevskyi and Serhii Mazorchuk, experienced commanders respected by their units—were removed. Their primary ‘fault’ was that they reported the situation honestly and truthfully: that the enemy was advancing, that withdrawals were necessary, that certain positions were being captured by the enemy. This was labeled as ‘panic’ or ‘lack of firmness,’ with the expectation to simply hold the line. Syrskyi himself undermines trust in his subordinates, constantly shifting responsibility. Due to this personnel reshuffling, it’s impossible to carry out tasks effectively. Commanders who show independence and responsibility, who report the difficult situation honestly, are dismissed immediately. This has become a widespread issue.

Third, there is a lack of accountability. While we have responsibility, it is dispersed. Responsibility always falls exclusively to those at the bottom. When problems arise on the front line, they have complex causes—ammunition shortages, troop deployment, training, tactics, the balance of forces and means, and the pressure from the enemy, which is critical. The enemy advances somewhere, pushes our positions back. There is always a search for scapegoats. The culprits are always the executors: first, the soldiers, then the battalion and brigade commanders. It is never the generals, never the operational command leaders, and never Oleksandr Syrskyi, who continuously intervenes in tactical military management and tells the commanders when and where to advance. This is complete absurdity; such practices don’t exist anywhere, not even in NATO. It’s pure Soviet-style thinking, with constant dilution of responsibility and shifting accountability downward. This leads to a global problem.

Fourth, there is the issue of losing trust in the army. This continuous lying and the establishment of a military command system based on lies and the irresponsible subjective views of some higher-ups, who behave more like gatekeepers than leaders, destroys trust. The lack of leadership in the army undermines confidence because there exists a caste of superiors who act like gatekeepers, shouting at subordinates, reprimanding them, and dismissing them from their positions. Meanwhile, there is a caste of untouchables at the top who are never held accountable for anything bad. They simply shout commands on maps, issue orders, and take no responsibility for the combat readiness of the troops, for losses, or for the proper conduct of subordinate units. This complete disconnect in accountability and management leads to a key problem: the loss of trust. The army simply does not trust the command because the system of total lies forces individuals to focus on reports, presentations, and paperwork, while everyone else must imitate this work and think about how to report to the higher-ups. Moreover, it’s necessary to provide not accurate information but rather what the superiors want to hear, guessing what they will say. This is an utterly inadequate management system; with such a system in place, it is impossible to conduct effective military operations.

I write about lies in general as the main problem; I have posts from 2022, even during Zaluzhnyi’s tenure. This issue did not start with Syrskyi. When Maryana Bezuhla speaks about it, unfortunately, the ‘Servant of the People’ party and Maryana Bezuhla herself are part of this lie because she constantly spreads it. Recently, she claimed that military-civilian administrations and the president are establishing some defensive lines in Donbas. This is pure deception. Sadly, Maryana Bezuhla lies just as much as the generals; she simply has a different agenda. She aims to shift the responsibility for what is happening on the front line away from the president and the ‘Servant of the People’ party, which allocates resources, is responsible for defensive lines and the distribution of funds, onto some generals who supposedly are fighting on their own and managing everything themselves.

This is very indicative of our government. They never take responsibility upon themselves. This applies to both Maryana Bezuhla and Syrskyi; they all behave similarly in this environment. Instead of uniting and taking responsibility as a team, they are solely focused on shifting blame and pointing fingers at others. Of course, this attitude comes from Zelensky and Yermak; it is perpetuated by those they appoint to command positions. This is the same pattern of behavior, where ‘whistleblowers’ are always looking for culprits and never say, ‘This is my responsibility, I need to check on this.’ A member of the defense committee from the ruling party is preoccupied with merely stating that some general is doing something.

Why is the front crumbling? The front typically collapses not because Russian command is deploying tank columns somewhere. Initially, a military unit is directed to the front. They are assigned a defensive sector that significantly exceeds their capability to carry out combat tasks. The unit, whether it’s a battalion or a brigade, is forced to stretch itself into a thin line without any reserves, without a second line of defense. They cannot express that this is unrealistic. If they say, ‘You have assigned us an impossible task,’ those commanders will be dismissed. This is the first lie.

The second lie. A unit is sent into battle. We lack proper defenses. In theory, we are defending, but in practice, troops are thrown into direct combat. They are assigned a sector where part of the positions has already been captured by the enemy. They cannot organize a defense at a rear position because they are not given that opportunity. They are told, ‘Hold your position here.’ If a commander starts to honestly report that the enemy is present and that they cannot advance, what happens? They are dismissed. Therefore, the commander must either imitate this process or figure out how to present a report that satisfies the higher-ups while not compromising themselves.

The third lie. The enemy is flanking our positions. Since all commanders are afraid to report the situation, no one reports that they have been pressured. There are still some honest commanders on the front lines, but unfortunately, they are few in number. In places like Selydove and New York, the same problems persist. Flanks are being breached, but the commander whose positions have been compromised does not report it because he will be dismissed. Neighbors report the situation instead. So, who gets dismissed in this case? The commander of the 15th Brigade of the National Guard, which was defending Selydove, was removed. For what reason? He reported that the situation was complex and that his flanks were being outflanked by the enemy, and that there were no positions of ours there. He was dismissed and replaced with someone who does not report. Who benefits from this? Who has gained anything from this situation?

The same situation exists with reserves. Commanders report that they have no personnel for rotation, that they need people because they cannot hold the defensive line without being able to replace troops. They are not given reinforcements; people are sent to newly formed units instead, ignoring the combat readiness of those already on the line. Commanders who say they cannot complete their mission without additional personnel—what happens to them? They are dismissed. As a result, instead of proper defensive planning, force deployment, and systematic enemy suppression, we get this political game dictated from above. The country’s leadership, starting with the Commander-in-Chief, demands positive news. Those video messages Zelensky records are not just rhetoric. He demands good news for these videos from his subordinates. And generals like Oleksandr Syrskyi, who cling to their positions more than they care for their subordinates, accept these rules. Maryana Bezuhla accepts them as well. They all want to report only good news. Anything negative—according to Syrskyi, it’s the fault of the soldier or the battalion commander; for Bezuhla, it’s Syrskyi’s fault; for some other official, it’s Bezuhla. They all point fingers at one another, but they lack collective responsibility for Ukraine’s defense, which should be their common duty according to their roles.

Yuriy Butusov

Tags: Analytics armed forces Opinion Ukraine Yuriy Butusov