Categories: ANALYTICS

Kursk and Putin’s failed game

Kursk and Putin's failed game

It’s time to summarize the strategic and political context of what has been happening over the last two weeks. This text is dedicated to that.

The entire intense discourse surrounding negotiations (both in the West and the East, as well as from internal sources) was based on a simple logic: Russia cannot be defeated in a competition of capabilities, so negotiations are necessary.

Because, you see, everything seems to be going Putin’s way. Yes, at the cost of enormous bloodshed, unjustified losses, and the future of Russia—but he is advancing in Donbas. Ukraine is facing significant problems, and now with Trump likely to win—it definitely seems like negotiations are needed. And escalation is out of the question because of the nuclear bomb or the potential spread of the war to the Baltics.

In a linear war, without changes or sudden moves, Putin’s logic worked: he presses on, Ukraine gradually cedes territories—yes, very, very slowly, but still cedes, the West fears escalation, and thus, concessions must be made. Plus, this was reinforced by psychological pressure on the military and civilian population of Ukraine through constant missile terror and the work of his information army.

Moreover, his propaganda effectively pushed the narrative that “Ukraine is incapable of conducting offensive operations.” The successes in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions were forgotten, and the 2023 counteroffensive was on everyone’s mind. The results of that offensive caused widespread disappointment both in Ukraine and in the West. All of this was meant to create the image of the “invincibility” of the Russian regime.

In a situation where Putin is throwing more and more old equipment into the war, dragging everything that can move and drive to Donbas for the sake of a few more kilometers, all this progress in Donbas reminds me of going all-in on zero. But, as we can see, it worked. And if we had also used all our forces and resources for the battles in Donbas, we would have remained within the logic favorable to Putin.

That’s why the military-political leadership and our partners needed to break out of this deadlock. Asymmetric actions were the only way to do this. The successful offensive operation in Russia proved three things:

1. Ukraine is capable of conducting offensive operations. When it has favorable conditions, instead of storming fortifications head-on. When it maintains information silence. When it can demonstrate creativity: this, by the way, is a nod to those who ask why it was Kursk and not Donbas or the South again.

2. Investing in Ukraine’s victory is justified. Because Ukraine can conduct effective offensive operations when it has the resources. Meanwhile, Putin lacks the strength to cover the entire front line.

3. Putin’s red lines are a bluff. Yes, an immediate shift hasn’t happened and couldn’t happen, because politics and bureaucracy think very inertly. They need time. But there has been a shift in the information space in Europe and the USA, noticeable to anyone who reads their press. Time is needed for the necessary decisions to be made and publicly justified.

Currently, there are three categories of people trying to undermine the value of the Defense Forces’ operation to transfer the war onto the enemy’s territory: Putin’s propagandists, Ukrainian defeatists, and the North Korean government. Most Western analysts agree that this offensive is a risky decision but one that is politically and militarily justified as a way to pressure Putin and his army.

It’s also important to remind everyone of the current stage of the war, especially in the context of the Russian advance on Pokrovsk and their narrative that “Donbas is being surrendered in exchange for Kursk.” The war is now about exhausting the enemy and depriving them of the ability to continue fighting. The goal is to force them to negotiate from a position of strength for Ukraine, or at least from a position of parity.

This goal can be achieved in two ways: either by delivering a direct and linear military defeat (for which the conditions are not yet in place), or by combining military and other tools to undermine the social and political legitimacy of Putin—at the very least, to continue the war, and at most, to govern Russia.

As for Donbas. First, it’s too early to write off Pokrovsk. Second, let me remind you: we’ve already lost Kupiansk, Izyum, and much more in this war. The enemy was near Kyiv and on the outskirts of Kharkiv. But now Russia is far from those positions, and Ukraine has brought the war to the aggressor’s territory. That’s the reality.

Yury Bogdanov