How to save Pokrovsk when the enemy is 8 km from the city?

I am in contact with all our brigades on this front. Over the course of a day, our aerial reconnaissance detects between 250 and 500 enemy infantrymen at the front line, which spans up to 18 km, and in the immediate rear. Some of them advance, some retreat, and some establish positions.

In other words, the enemy is not deploying tank columns or storming with battalions; the numerical advantage does not carry significant multiples. The enemy’s tactic involves small reconnaissance groups of 3-6 people moving along several directions, controlled by drones, and targeting our positions with drones and artillery. The Russians are suffering significant losses, but they manage to infiltrate between our combat positions, sometimes our forces withdraw after neutralizing several assault groups, and sometimes our forces fall back due to command issues, allowing the enemy to quickly occupy empty positions. This is because the Russians have multiple echelons of combat orders in the offensive (with immediate execution for refusal to attack), while we have single-echelon combat orders, making every stronghold vulnerable.

To stop the enemy through attrition, we need to establish a defensive line and stop engaging in frontal battles in unfortified positions. To make such attrition costly for the enemy, so that their losses become 5-10 times greater, and to drive out the infantry, we need well-organized and planned defense, decentralized actions, interaction between troops with maximum use of drones and electronic warfare (EW), fortified positions, cleared sectors for fire and damage, and, crucially, our own capable infantry that doesn’t withdraw because it’s invincible, but because it’s well-trained, well-managed, trusts its commanders, and has replacements for rotation and support.

To effectively use drones and EW, they need to be essentially subordinated to a single center; such interaction must start functioning, and our EW must stop interfering with our own drones. We need to deploy hundreds of Mavics and Autels to each brigade immediately to halt the enemy by increasing the number of drops. Supplies from the state are minimal and cover less than 10% of the needs.

Since the command of the Joint Task Force cannot and will not be able to organize adequate management and application at the operational and tactical levels, someone must partially take over the functions of the Joint Task Force in this direction, just as it was successfully assigned, for example, to the 58th Motorized Infantry Brigade on another front.

On the outskirts of Pokrovsk, at least one capable brigade needs to be deployed. Given the enemy’s advancement of about 500 meters a day, it will have no more than a week to deploy. We need one brigade with an organized and effective staff capable of establishing interaction on the ground between all attached units, drones and EW, reconnaissance and strike assets.

Pokrovsk is home to Ukraine’s only mine producing coking coal, even now. If Pokrovsk is lost, we will not only have to purchase all coking coal abroad, but also increase the load on transportation to bring additional millions of tons from overseas. If the troops defending Pokrovsk receive funds from the state and the mine owner (Metinvest) for drones, EW, pickups, and ATVs, and provided there is one adequately organized brigade, it is quite possible to stop the Russian advance.

This is highly beneficial for the state and the defense forces.

In the photo: dynamics of the Russian Armed Forces’ advance towards the Pokrovsk agglomeration.

Yuriy Butusov

Tags: donetsk oblast Pokrovsk Russia russia ukraine war Ukraine