- It’s probably worth starting with something that is not particularly liked by Ukrainians. The full-scale invasion began primarily because Putin saw this war not only as the culmination of an existential conflict aimed at the destruction of Ukrainians as a nation. There was also a second, possibly more significant reason: a small victorious war was supposed to restore Russia’s status as a “third pole of the world.” This is the fundamental reason for this war. Without understanding this, it will be difficult for us to make certain predictions about future actions of the Kremlin.
- Now, about the changes that have occurred in Putin’s mind. The Prigozhin March was a turning point for Putin. He realized one important thing: the elites are so afraid of him that he can do anything. Literally, “anything.” Until then, he was still wary of many things. I understand that many will now say that he could do anything before, but that is not the case. By 2022, Putin had even become something of a “collective Putin” and was forced to humiliatingly establish a system of collective responsibility. From this moment (after the Prigozhin March), it can be metaphorically said that a new Putin was born, who offered the Russians a new national idea. And this idea is as follows: Putin wants to live as long as possible and die in the presidential chair. It is no longer about history textbooks or anything else. The main idea of the Russian state is the long and untroubled life of Putin. You might ask, what about the third pole of the world? That idea remains, but it is now postponed indefinitely. More precisely, the timing is determined by Putin’s life. He understands perfectly well that technologically (in terms of the latest technologies defining the current era), he cannot make Russia the third pole. Therefore, all his strategy on the external front boils down to the following: creating problems for competitors (chaotizing processes), which should lead to a return to dialogue with Russia. Simply put, he will try to create problems in any part of the world and, importantly, within rival countries on the one hand, and on the other, he will demand to sit down at the negotiating table with him. And now the most unpleasant thing for us: Putin understands that he can no longer break off relations with Ukraine. For the start of dialogue, he will sell the West the myth of influence over the axis of evil. His current game is selling air. More precisely, he wants to “guarantee” the West the safety of North Korea and Iran, clear rules of the game in the Sahel, etc., in exchange for a constant dialogue, part of which will involve lifting sanctions. I emphasize once again – sanctions are just a part of this dialogue in Putin’s understanding.
- Now, regarding the internal affairs in Russia. The main visible change is the “naked party,” which has become a Rubicon for the elites. The masses did not fully understand it until the end, but new rules of the game have been established, which can be summarized by a Kafkaesque formula: “You don’t know for what you will be punished, but you can be punished for anything.” The only possible behavior in this coordinate system is obedience and “being good towards the abuser.” This is the basic stance of the government, which the elites have submissively accepted. Over the year, if nothing particularly changes, the masses will understand this. They are already feeling a sharp deterioration in their lives (two-thirds of Russians have no savings at all). But the government is moving towards making even more Russians live on the brink of poverty. At the same time, the government is not building a separate state apparatus, as many believe. The Kremlin is constructing a societal structure in which there is a passive half that not only fears the government and obeys it (in Russia, 99% of the population has feared the government for 400 years). This passive half are the apologists of the regime, for whom two mythological frameworks have been created: 1) they are against change because change would mean things would get even worse (once a friend of mine described the 90s situation when he hadn’t been paid for months, and the workshop manager told them: “We are needed by no one beyond the gate”). Expanding this base of people is one of the Kremlin’s main tasks. 2) Creating a relatively large minority layer to be respected because of their actions in the war. At the same time, the main myth of this war will not (only) be about victories. It will be about money. This layer has never had, and will never have, as much money as it does now. And stopping payments tomorrow will hardly change their attitude towards Putin (unless an external or different internal propaganda machine is activated). In all this idyll, there is a large spoonful of tar for Putin. Those who are building this model (primarily Sergey Kiriyenko) are thinking not only about Putin. They are thinking about his death and the transition of power.
- Until recently, no oligarch had any influence on political processes in Russia. In the current coordinate system, the so-called “Kremlin Towers” have lost their primary essence. Previously, there were civilized and sometimes less civilized discussions between the towers, resulting in Putin gaining sole arbitration rights, while the state received “discussed” economic, and less frequently, political and geopolitical decisions. Now, the role of the Kremlin towers has been reduced to that of the oligarchy: essentially, servicing personnel. The main decisions are beginning to be confined to a relatively small circle of people responsible for Putin’s security. In other words, contemporary Russia has largely transitioned to manual control over the most critical issues, and the circle of decision-makers is becoming narrower. Moreover, Putin is starting to actively create systems of discomfort for his surroundings. This began when Patrushev was dismissed, who was de facto a “spoiler” for the security forces. Patrushev lost this role (having lost it because of the merger of his group with Rostec’s Chemezov group). This merger posed no real threat to Putin’s power, but based on the principle that there’s no smoke without fire, Putin demoted Patrushev. However, he did not strike at Chemezov, who oversees 80% of Russia’s defense industry (Putin’s logic here is simple – don’t break what works). So, after breaking up the Patrushev-Chemezov tandem, Putin did not stop. Here are just a few examples from the past month. For instance, Putin’s advisor Dyumin has gained the right to control Chemezov (though Chemezov is still to be controlled by Defense Minister Baluyev). It’s worth noting the arrest of Senator Savelyev, who was Dyumin’s financier. Another significant development is the creation of a deputy head position for the National Guard (though there’s no appointment yet), but National Guard chief Zolotov is already on edge. All this is happening against the backdrop of sanctioned dual power within the FSB by Putin. It is currently difficult to say who is more important: Bortnikov or his first deputy Korolyov, who is responsible, among other things, for reporting on the personal lives of the elite. All this occurs against two subjective factors: due to aging, Putin is making decisions more slowly, and the time from the decision to create a position to filling the vacancy can stretch over months. The second factor is also related to aging, but not just physical – it’s the aging of the system: Putin seems to be increasingly descending into paranoia. But, being a coward by nature, he builds in his mind a system of power that mirrors the entire state – he constructs a system of a besieged fortress, where he himself is the fortress. At the same time, he plays both the roles of attacker and defender.
- As for the common people, Putin has never considered them as subjects. The people are offered one option: worsening living conditions (with myths, as mentioned above, serving as compensators) and fear due to the strengthening of the repressive apparatus. Putin genuinely believes that control over the elites is equivalent to control over the people.
Finally, one should ask oneself whether a “sudden removal” is possible. The answer is straightforward: a sudden removal is possible in two cases (excluding the exotic version of poisoning orchestrated by other intelligence agencies, which I consider almost fantastical, although Putin does everything to provoke everyone): a lone shooter, as was recently the case with Trump, or a deadly fright experienced by one of Putin’s extremely influential associates. While this does not seem likely at the moment, it cannot be ruled out. However, Beria only dared to act when he realized he could be shot.
Vadym Denysenko
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Politics Putin Russia russia ukraine war Ukraine Vladimir Putin