Categories: UKRAINE

Ukraine’s grain corridor analysis

Ukraine's grain corridor analysis

The average number of ships arriving per day at the 3 ports of the Odesa region within the “grain corridor” is an indicator of the level of military risks in the Black Sea region.

We will immediately present the results, which are quite persuasive.

In September 2022, it was 5.9 vessels per day;

in October 2022 – 5.1;

in November 2022 – 3.3;

in December 2022 – 3.2;

in January 2023 – 2.8;

in February 2023 – 2.5;

in March 2023 – 2.8;

from April 1 to April 17, 2023 – 2.2 ships per day.

In November 2022, there was a reduction from 5.9 to 3.3 (almost by half) of the number of ships that received permits of the Joint Coordination Center in Istanbul for sailing towards Ukrainian ports.

This happened after air and sea drones attacked the Russian Black Sea Fleet warships in the Sevastopol bays on October 29, 2022 and damaged several ships.

On the same day, Russia announced the suspension of its participation in the “grain agreement” under an invented pretext of damage to ships of the Black Sea Fleet and (allegedly) civilian vessels involved in guaranteeing the security of the “grain corridor”.

The latter was 100% fiction, as neither Russian warships nor fictitious “civilian vessels” actually take any part in it.

You may remember that when the UN and Turkey subsequently declared that the agreement was still in force, and the UN and Turkish inspectors continued inspecting ships and giving them permits to continue moving without involving a Russian representative, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russia was resuming participation in the Black Sea grain initiative .

From April 1 to April 17, 2023, the average figure was = 2.2 ships per day.

In contrast to October-November 2022 (drone attack on Sevastopol), nothing like that happened in March-April 2023 (we do not consider the missile attack on Feodosia to be related to maritime traffic in the distorted imagination of Russian leaders).

So the reasons for Moscow’s order to slow down the grain traffic are different.

The main reason, in our estimation, is the approaching presidential elections in Turkey (the election date of 14.05.2023 almost coincides with the date of 18.05.2023, until which Russia believes it has agreed extension of the “grain corridor”, although other parties believe that the agreement was extended until July 18).

That is, the Russian Federation warns that it will consider extending the agreement depending on whether the incumbent Turkish president remains in office.

The second (new) emphasis is the Russian Federation’s top-level declaration (by the Minister of Foreign Affairs) of new demands for the extension of the grain agreement.

We will remind you that previously it was (1) the promotion of Russian food export, which no one prevented, and (2) the resumption of the operation of the ammonia pipeline to Odesa (it enters Ukraine near Kupyansk, Kharkiv region – along the front line between the Kharkiv and the occupied Luhansk regions. the resumption of ammonia pumping through this pipe would definitely require a cease-fire on the front)

Today, the Russian Federation goes much further in its “wishes”, it demands:

(3) to reconnect Roselkhozbank to the SWIFT system;

(4) to resume deliveries of agricultural machinery, spare parts and service to Russia;

(5) to unblock foreign assets and accounts of Russian companies related to the production and transportation of food and fertilizers (this is a specification of clause (1);

(6) to lift the ban on Russian ships’ access to foreign ports.

It is quite clear that neither Ukraine nor the countries that imposed sanctions will agree to these demands.

We should also understand that with the escalation on the front (Ukraine’s expected counteroffensive) the Russian Federation will do everything possible to stop the operation of the “grain corridor” by disrupting inspections (which it demonstrated twice in April 2023).

Our recommendation in the current conditions is as follows: Ukraine and the civilized world should be ready for such a scenario.

And for this purpose, among other things, it is necessary to immediately resolve the problems that have appeared in the functioning of alternative routes through the EU countries (it’s up to grain market specialists to decide how to do it, which we are not, so we do not consider it possible to advise anything).

Andrii Klymenko